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Abstract 
Public investment project appraisal is based on cost-benefit analysis of both the social and economic 
costs and benefits of a project. By taking into account both the social and economic effects, 
government agencies in charge of investing public funds aim to reach the socio-economically most 
advantageous end result. 
Cost-benefit analysis compares projects based on the present values of their direct socio-economic 
costs and benefits but does not include evaluation of potential project finance arrangements. Project 
costs are implicitly assumed to be paid when the asset is ready for use, while the benefits produced 
by the project are received over a long forecast period. Including an evaluation of available financing 
arrangements can provide valuable additional information to public decision makers for allocating 
scarce public funds. 
The aim of this study was to complement the information provided by cost-benefit analysis by 
examining two research questions: (1) ”Effect of Project Finance on the Socio-economic Profitability 
of the Hailuoto Causeway project” and (2) “Expediting Project Start with off-budget Financing”. 
The research was carried out as a quantitative case study, using data about the socio-economic 
benefits and costs of the Hailuoto Causeway project estimated for the official project appraisal 
report. Three financial models were built to simulate (1) direct budget financing of the project as 
well as (2) debt financing via a public project company and (3) procurement of the project via a 
comprehensive service agreement, with the project financed and built by a private service provider. 
The effect of expedited project start was examined by testing delayed budget-financed project 
timelines against a PPP service agreement starting on time. 
The results indicate that a long-term, debt-funded project finance arrangement can substantially 
improve the socio-economic profitability of a project when evaluated based on present values. The 
most significant factors affecting the effectiveness of project financing arrangements are the cost of 
debt financing, the societal discount rate used, length of the project’s investment period as well as 
potential efficiency advantages of the private service provider in the PPP model. Private financing 
can be employed to finance projects outside public investment budgets. The results from the case 
study indicate that a budget constraint would need to delay the project by two to four years for a 
private financing arrangement to be socio-economically preferable over budget financing. 
Based on the results different project characteristics call for different financing arrangements. 
Thus, an evaluation of available project financing arrangements should be considered to 
complement the cost-benefit analysis of a project. 
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Julkisten infrastruktuurihankkeiden arviointi perustuu hankkeen yhteiskunnalliset ja taloudelliset 
hyödyt ja kustannukset huomioivaan hyöty-kustannusanalyysiin. Huomioimalla sekä 
yhteiskunnalliset että taloudelliset vaikutukset julkisen sektorin investointipäätöksistä vastaavat 
päätöksentekijät pyrkivät yhteiskuntataloudellisesti parhaaseen lopputulokseen. 
Hyöty-kustannusanalyysissä hankkeita verrataan niiden suorien yhteiskuntataloudellisten 
hyötyjen ja kustannusten nykyarvojen perusteella. Hankkeessa mahdollisesti hyödynnettävien 
projektirahoitusmallien arviointi ei kuitenkaan sisälly hyöty-kustannusanalyysiin. Hankkeen 
kustannusten oletetaan epäsuorasti tulevan maksettavaksi hankkeen valmistuessa, kun taas 
hankkeen tuottamat hyödyt saadaan vasta pitkän ennustejakson aikana. Käytettävissä olevien 
rahoitusjärjestelyjen arvioinnin sisällyttäminen hankearvioinnin yhteyteen voi tuoda arvokasta 
lisätietoa päätöksentekijöille ja tukea näin rajallisten julkisten resurssien mahdollisimman 
tehokasta käyttöä. 
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli täydentää hyöty-kustannusanalyysin tuottamaa tietoa 
tarkastelemalla kahta tutkimuskysymystä: (1) ”Projektirahoituksen vaikutus Hailuodon kiinteä 
yhteys -hankkeen yhteiskuntataloudelliseen kannattavuuteen” ja (2) ”Hankkeen aikaistaminen 
budjetin ulkopuolisella rahoituksella”. Tutkimus suoritettiin kvantitatiivisena tapaustutkimuksena 
hyödyntäen Hailuodon kiinteä yhteys -hankkeen virallista hankearviointia varten tuotettua 
ennustetietoa hankkeen yhteiskuntataloudellisista hyödyistä ja kustannuksista. Tutkimuksessa 
tuotettiin kolme taloudellista mallia, joilla simuloitiin (1) hankkeen suoraa budjettirahoitusta sekä 
(2) velkarahoitusta julkisen hankeyhtiön kautta ja (3) hankkeen hankintaa yksityiseltä 
palveluntuottajalta kokonaispalvelusopimuksena, missä yksityinen palveluntuottaja rahoittaa ja 
rakentaa hankkeen (PPP-malli). Hankkeen aikaistamisen vaikutusta tutkittiin vertaamalla 
viivästynyttä budjettirahoitettavaa hanketta ja suunnitellussa aikataulussa aloitettavaa PPP-
hanketta. 
Tulokset osoittavat, että pitkäaikainen projektirahoitusjärjestely voi parantaa hankkeen 
nykyarvoista yhteiskuntataloudellista kannattavuutta huomattavasti. Merkittävimmät 
projektirahoitusjärjestelyjen tehokkuuteen vaikuttavat tekijät ovat vieraan pääoman kustannus, 
yhteiskunnallinen diskonttokorko, hankkeen investointijakson pituus sekä PPP-mallissa yksityisen 
palveluntuottajan mahdollinen tehokkuusetu. Yksityisrahoitusta voidaan käyttää hankkeiden 
rahoittamiseen julkisten investointibudjettien ulkopuolella. Tapaustutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, 
että budjettirajoitteen tulisi viivästyttää hanketta kahdesta neljään vuotta, jotta 
yksityisrahoitusjärjestely olisi yhteiskuntataloudellisesti kannattavampi vaihtoehto kuin 
budjettirahoitus. 
Tutkimustulosten perusteella ominaisuuksiltaan erilaiset hankkeet vaativat erilaisia 
rahoitusjärjestelyjä. Tästä johtuen hankkeen hyöty-kustannusanalyysiä tulisi harkita 
täydennettäväksi mahdollisten projektirahoitusjärjestelyjen arvioinnilla. 
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1. Introduction 
Cost-benefit analysis of public infrastructure investment opportunities is performed based on 
estimated costs and forecast socio-economic benefits of an investment project over a long 
appraisal period. Socio-economic benefits include both direct financial benefits as well as 
social benefits that result directly from realization of the project. Costs included in the analysis 
consist of the direct costs associated with building and financing the infrastructure asset. 
Effects of potential project finance arrangements, however, are outside the scope of the 
analysis. Evaluating potential financing arrangements already in the project appraisal phase 
can provide valuable additional information to public decision makers as they allocate scarce 
public funds to projects. This study examines the effects of three different financing 
arrangements on the result of a cost-benefit analysis of a real Finnish public infrastructure 
project. 
As a case study, I use the socio-economic costs and benefits estimated for the cost-benefit 
analysis of the Hailuoto Causeway, a project by the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 
to build a fixed land connection between Finland’s third largest island, Hailuoto, and mainland 
Oulu in North Ostrobothnia. I build models for three financing arrangements to study how they 
affect the results of the cost-benefit analysis. The first model, referred to as the Direct Budget 
Financing model, represents a theoretical base case without financing arrangements, with 
investment costs paid from the public budget as they are incurred. The direct budget financing 
model used in this study is not intended to represent the actual practice of how budget financing 
is applied, rather it serves as a base case for comparison against project finance models where 
costs are deferred until the project’s operating period. Building on that base case model, I build 
two further models to simulate project finance arrangements that have previously been applied 
in the Finnish setting: the Project Company model and the PPP (Public Private Partnership) 
model. In the Project Company model, a project company owned and managed by a 
government agency is set up to manage the project and, using low-cost debt secured on the 
sovereign credit rating, finances it during construction and then amortizes the debt with interest 
over the project’s 30-year appraisal period. In the PPP model the project is contracted out to a 
private service provider as a comprehensive service agreement. The basic structure of the PPP 
model is similar to that of the Project Company model; the Service Provider (a privately owned 
and operated project company) uses a highly levered capital structure to finance the project 
during construction and then amortizes the debt with interest during the project’s 30-year 
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appraisal period. In addition, the PPP model includes three cost factors not included in the 
public sector-driven Project Company model. First, the Service Provider in the private sector-
managed PPP model uses a small proportion of equity financing and compensates its investors 
with a return appropriate for an unlisted infrastructure investment. Second, the Service Provider 
incurs management overhead costs not included in the public Project Company, and third, the 
public sector incurs additional transaction costs due to the longer and more complex 
procurement process for PPP projects compared to projects paid for directly from the public 
budget. 
Considering the additional cost elements associated with private financing, using the PPP 
model instead of the public sector driven models would make no sense without compensating 
benefits. Benefits associated with the PPP model include potential efficiency advantages 
resulting from private sector’s more agile design processes, incentives to lower costs and the 
ability to transfer project risks away from the public sector. Further, PPP arrangements may 
enable financing outside public investment budgets, allowing for augmentation of public 
financing and enabling projects to take place earlier than budget financing would allow. 
The research questions examined by this study are the following: (1) the effect of project 
finance on the socio-economic profitability of the Hailuoto Causeway project and (2) the effect 
of expediting project start with off-budget financing.  
If the cost of financing is lower than the discount rate, a project finance arrangement should 
improve the present-value benefit-to-cost ratios, economic net present values and economic 
rates of return of investment projects purely due to the time value of money. I perform 
sensitivity analysis with regards to several factors that can be expected to impact the 
advantageousness of project finance; the societal discount rate, the interest rate, length of the 
project’s investment period, the cost of private equity financing and the private sector 
efficiency advantage.  
If a socio-economically profitable project does not fit into the public investment budget, there 
are two main options; delay the project until sufficient budget is available or use private 
financing to augment the public budget. I measure the opportunity cost of project delay in the 
direct budget financing model against the higher financing costs of the PPP model to find the 
length of delay needed to make private financing the preferable option. Further, I examine three 
scenarios with altered PPP model parameters to test for changes. 
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The core data for this study comes from the official Hailuoto Causeway Road Plan 
commissioned by North Ostrobothnia Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the 
Environment. Using the present values of the socio-economic costs and benefits reported in the 
cost-benefit analysis section of the road plan, I build a model to replicate the annual costs and 
benefits of the project. To build the two project finance models described above, I gather long-
term interest rate data from public databases as well as data regarding infrastructure investment 
equity returns and the historical performance of PPP projects from academic literature. This 
data is complemented by insights received from discussions with professionals familiar with 
public infrastructure investments and Finnish PPP projects. 
In the following chapter I provide a view into concepts relevant for this study. First, socio-
economic cost-benefit analysis; the theoretical basis, general framework set by the European 
Commission for European Union Member States and the project appraisal practices of the 
Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, the agency responsible for executing transport 
infrastructure investments in Finland. Second, a brief look at the general characteristics of 
public infrastructure investments. Third, an overview of potential sources of financing for these 
investments. Sources of financing are divided into public budgets and private capital. I present 
information about the public budgeting process, sources of funds for budgets and the public 
project company model as it applies to this study. About private capital, I present a brief history 
of private financing, how it is applied to public investments, and the benefits and drawbacks 
compared to public budget financing. Fourth, I provide a look at the societal discount rate; a 
combination of uncertainty and time preferences used to discount the value of future 
generations’ welfare into the present. As the fifth and final concept, I examine private equity 
investors’ return requirements for public infrastructure investments; the current cost of equity 
and the factors that affect it. 
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2. Literature Review: Relevant Concepts 
2.1. Cost-benefit Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis is, in its broadest definition, an analytical method of comparing the 
expected costs and benefits of different available investment opportunities. Methods falling 
under the general term are used by both private companies and public decision makers. This 
study focuses exclusively on the analyses of the public sector. In their 1978 seminal work, 
Robert Sugden and Alan Williams define cost-benefit analysis as a systematic method of 
project appraisal based on broad, social objectives taking into account all members of the 
public, irrespective of who is affected and of whether or not the effect is captured in a financial 
account (Sugden & Williams, 1978). Approached from such a perspective, cost-benefit 
analysis is a highly useful tool in evaluating public investment projects, as the nature of public 
decision-making differs materially from the return-driven investment decisions of private 
companies – public authorities invest money gathered from the public as taxes towards 
providing vital services to the society, with the goals of providing a platform for the society to 
function on and improving the overall welfare of that society.  
Socio-economic cost-benefit analysis of a project requires the identification of all effects of the 
project, both benefits and costs, on the individual welfare of all members of the public affected 
by the project, and the measurement of those effects in a common unit, most often money 
(Sugden & Williams, 1978). In practice it is not possible to identify all effects a project will 
have over its lifetime and, as will be mentioned in the following section, in order to avoid 
double-counting it has become common practice to only include effects that are considered to 
result directly from the project, while indirect and wider effects are disregarded. According to 
the Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects issued by the European 
Commission, measuring these effects in monetary terms is achieved by calculating shadow 
prices for the costs and measuring the public’s willingness-to-pay for the benefits. Shadow 
prices are theoretical values used to estimate the social opportunity cost of goods and services 
consumed as inputs to the project. They are used instead of market prices to avoid possible 
distortions due to market inefficiencies, for example government subsidies, monopoly mark-
ups, tariffs, or unavailability of market prices. Project users’ marginal willingness-to-pay 
measures the maximum amount consumers are willing to pay for a unit of a good or a service 
produced by the project, thus estimating the value of the outputs of the project to the society. 
(Sartori et al. 2014). When it comes to transport projects, especially when no road tolls are 
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applied (as is the case in Finland), proxies are needed to estimate public benefits such as travel 
time savings. For example, the International Transport Forum and the Finnish Transport 
Infrastructure Agency estimate travel time savings based on a combination of travel time saving 
and travel time reliability gain over the current situation resulting from the project, and the 
hourly value of travel time and the hourly value of travel time reliability (Veryard, 2016 and 
Ristikartano, Iikkanen & Mukula, 2013). 
According to Sugden and Williams, a cost-benefit analysis begins with a problem, with a scope 
focused enough to provide a clear direction for the analysis but wide enough not to impose a 
pre-selected end result. Alternative solutions to the problem should be identified in the first 
stages of the analysis and some of the most promising alternatives should be compared in the 
cost-benefit analysis (Sugden & Williams, 1978); the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 
typically compares three alternatives, of which one must be a “light project alternative” (0++), 
in which the project would be completed on a smaller scale. Other alternatives generally 
include a “scaled-down present state” (0-), where the current transport service is either closed 
or scaled down, a “present state” (0), where only routine maintenance and investments aimed 
at maintaining the current infrastructure are performed, and an “improved present state” (0+), 
where, in addition to “present state”, investments aimed at maintaining the current service level 
for e.g. increased amount of users are made. These investments must be small compared to the 
project (Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011). 
When all the costs and benefits of the project being appraised, both economic and social and 
affecting both direct participants and the wider society, have been identified and tallied up, the 
project should be undertaken if the gainers from the project could, in theory, compensate the 
losers while still retaining a net gain (Sugden & Williams, 1978). 
2.1.1. Cost-benefit analysis framework based on European Union guidelines 
The Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects (Sartori et al. 2014) published by 
the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy sets a 
framework that the Member States follow in defining their own project appraisal procedures. 
The latest version of the guidelines was published in 2014. European Union Member States 
seeking EU funding for their projects shall deliver an evaluation of their projects to the EU 
competent authority based on these guidelines. This subchapter provides an overview of the 
framework set by European Commission’s guide. 
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The analytical framework of the cost-benefit analysis is built on the following five concepts: 
1. Opportunity cost 
2. Long-term perspective 
3. Calculation of economic performance indicators expressed in monetary terms 
4. Microeconomic approach 
5. Incremental approach 
 “The opportunity cost of a good or service is defined as the potential gain from the best 
alternative forgone, when a choice needs to be made between several mutually exclusive 
alternatives“ (Sartori et al. 2014). Investment decisions taken based on profit motives and price 
mechanisms may, in the presence of market imperfections, lead to socially undesirable 
outcomes. The cost-benefit analysis framework aims to value the input, output, and external 
effects of an investment project at their social opportunity costs in order to properly capture 
the return on investment to social welfare. 
The cost-benefit analysis framework adopts a long-term perspective, with an analysis period 
of 10 to 30 years (sometimes even longer) depending on the sector of the project. Adopting a 
long-term perspective creates the need to set a proper time horizon, forecast future costs and 
benefits, adopt appropriate discount rates and perform a risk assessment to account for the 
uncertainty associated with long observation periods. 
Cost-benefit analysis is based on a set of predetermined project objectives. These objectives 
are given monetary values as a part of the analysis, with all positive (benefits) and negative 
(costs) welfare effects of the project appraised. Economic Net Present Value (ENPV) and 
Economic Rate of Return (ERR) as the key indicators of profitability used for comparing and 
ranking competing projects or alternative investments. 
The cost-benefit analysis is a microeconomic approach to evaluation of public investments. 
The impact of an investment project on the society as a whole is assessed via the calculation of 
economic performance indicators. The expected welfare changes, such as direct employment 
or external environmental effects realized by the project are reflected in the economic net 
present value, but indirect (e.g. on secondary markets) and wider effects (e.g. on public funds, 
employment, regional growth, etc.) should be excluded. Two reasons are given for excluding 
indirect and wider effects: First, these are usually transformed, redistributed and capitalized 
forms of direct effects and thus there exists a risk of double counting and second, there is little 
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practice on how to appraise these effects and thus appraisal would inevitably rely on 
assumptions, the reliability of which would be difficult to assess. Providing a qualitative 
description of these expected indirect and wider impacts is encouraged, however, to explain 
the contribution of the project to European Union regional policy goals. 
The incremental approach means that the cost-benefit analysis compares a scenario where the 
project goes ahead to a counterfactual scenario without the project. This requires that a 
counterfactual scenario be defined based on what would happen without the project. In cases 
where the project is an entirely new asset, the counterfactual scenario would be one with no 
operations. If the project is aimed at improving an existing asset, there are two alternatives for 
the counterfactual scenario: Business as Usual (BAU) and Do-minimum. Despite the naming 
convention, Business as Usual is the minimum-effort scenario which should include the costs 
and revenues/benefits from operating and maintaining the service at a still-operable level. Do-
minimum includes small adaptation investments that were programmed to take place regardless 
of the project. The Do-minimum counterfactual scenario thus includes higher costs and 
benefits, meaning that the incremental gains of the project are lower than when appraising 
against the Business as Usual scenario. 
After the approach for the counterfactual scenario has been chosen and the associated cash 
flows defined, projections for cash flows of the proposed project are made, taking into account 
all the investment, financial and economic costs and benefits resulting from the project. 
Finally, the difference between the cash flows in the with-the-project and the counterfactual 
scenarios is considered for analysis in the cost-benefit analysis. This means that the financial 
and economic performance indicators are calculated on the incremental cash flows only. 
(Sartori et al. 2014). 
2.1.2. Appraisal practices of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency 
The project appraisal methods of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency (FTIA, 
Väylävirasto) are set out in the 2011 Liikenneväylien hankearvioinnin yleisohje (General 
Appraisal Guide for Transport Infrastructure Projects) (this author’s translation) (Metsäranta 
& Laakso, 2011) and specifically for roads in the 2013 Tiehankkeiden arviointiohje (Appraisal 
Guide for Road Projects) (this author’s translation) (Ristikartano, Iikkanen & Mukula, 2013). 
This subchapter will provide an overview of the appraisal practices of the FTIA.  
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Project appraisal steps set out in the FTIA’s General Appraisal Guide for Transport 
Infrastructure Projects (Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011) are: 
1. Description of the Starting Point 
2. Description of the Effects 
3. Appraisal of the Project 
4. Follow-up and post-project appraisal plan 
5. Appraisal reporting and documentation 
In description of the starting point, the transportation needs, design status, links to the larger 
transportation network and goals as well as costs related to the project are laid out. Project 
goals should aim for simplicity (avoiding overlapping traffic networks), wide coverage, 
accuracy and understandability. The description should also explain how the project connects 
to the wider transportation network, the role of the project in the traffic infrastructure design 
of the area and its role in national land use plans.  
A comparison of the project to alternative project options, including at minimum the 
benchmark Business as Usual and/or Do-minimum counterfactual scenario in line with 
concepts 1. Opportunity Cost and 5. Incremental Approach of the 2014 European Commission 
Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects, as well as other identified options, is 
done in this step, and the cost estimates for each option are presented. Further, a traffic forecast 
is provided illustrating the expected trend growth of traffic volume and the impact of the project 
on demand for transportation. 
In description of the effects, the significant effects influencing decision-making are chosen and 
the criteria, measures, goals and design parameters of those effects are described. In line with 
concept 2. Long-term perspective of the 2014 European Commission Guide to Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Investment Projects, the benefit and cost effects of the project are estimated for the 
duration of the construction and the following 30 years of operation. Of the chosen project 
effects, the current status, forecast status in the benchmark scenario, the forecast status in 
alternative project options as well as the marginal effects of the project options over the 
benchmark scenario, in line with concept 5. Incremental Approach of the 2014 European 
Commission Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects are presented. The effects 
are described in quantitative terms whenever possible. If no quantitative information is 
available, the effects are described qualitatively. 
Effects commonly assessed in all transport infrastructure investments include: 
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• Effects on users (time and monetary effects) 
• Effects on producers (route operation costs and freight/ticket revenue) 
• Effects on the public economy (network maintenance costs and tax revenue) 
• Effects on traffic safety (change in accident risk and accident costs) 
• Effects on the environment (impact on emissions, exposure to noise and vibration as 
well as emission and noise costs) 
In the appraisal of the project, the impact of the project is assessed via an impact assessment 
and a cost-benefit analysis. A feasibility study is carried out where major risks related to the 
decision to finance the project as well as the progress of the design and administrative processes 
are assessed. Based on the analyses in these three sections conclusions regarding the socio-
economic effectiveness, impact and feasibility of the project are made. 
The cost-benefit analysis forms a large part of this step. In the cost-benefit analysis the marginal 
difference in the value of an effect between the proposed project and the benchmark alternative 
is included. All effects that can be evaluated in monetary values with established procedures 
and clear valuation principles can be included in the analysis. 
The base year (year 0) of the cost-benefit analysis is the year during which the project is 
completed and opened to traffic. Investment costs and effects on traffic during construction are 
taken into account from the beginning of construction to year 0. The effects of commissioning 
the investment are calculated for the full 30 years that follow commissioning. The present value 
of the effects is calculated by discounting those effects to year 0. The discount factor used is 
described in section 2.4.1. 
Project benefits are typically cost savings, such as decreases in route operation costs or travel 
time. Negative effects are additional costs, such as increased maintenance or emission costs. 
Each benefit and cost item is accounted for only once. 
Deductible taxes are not taken into account in the analysis, while non-deductible taxes (such 
as fuel and value added taxes paid by private persons) are. 
Time, accident, emission and noise costs are increased by 1,125% (decreased from 1,5% in 
2013) (Ristikartano et al. 2013) annually to account for an increase in the general income level. 
This adjustment is not done for other costs. 
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According to the General Appraisal Guide for Transport Infrastructure Projects (Metsäranta & 
Laakso, 2011) The present values of the benefits and costs in year 0 are determined by the 
following formula: 
𝐵𝑝, 𝐶𝑝 =  ∑
1
(1+𝑑)𝑡
30
𝑡=1 (𝐵𝑡, 𝐶𝑡) (1), where 
Bp = Present value of benefits in year 0, 
Cp = Present value of costs in year 0, 
Bt = Present value of benefits in year t, 
Ct = Present value of costs in year t and 
D  = Societal discount rate. 
During construction investment costs and construction-related nuisances are incurred. The 
present values of these items in year 0 is determined by the following formula: 
𝐼𝑝, 𝐶𝑟𝑝 =  ∑
1
(1+𝑑)𝑡
0
𝑡=−𝑛 (𝐼𝑡, 𝐶𝑟𝑡) (2), where 
Ip = Present value of investment costs in year 0, 
Crp = Present value of construction-related nuisances in year 0, 
It = Present value of investment costs in year t, 
Crt = Present value of construction-related nuisances in year t and 
D = Societal discount rate 
A part of the investment costs and construction-related nuisances can be incurred during years 
1 to 30. These may consist of finishing work after opening to traffic and heavy maintenance 
investments during the appraisal period. These costs are discounted to the base year according 
to formula (1). 
The residual value of the investment is a benefit received in year 30 (end of the appraisal 
period). The present value in year 0 of residual value is determined by the following formula: 
𝑉𝑝 =
1
(1+𝑑)30
(𝑉) (3), where 
Vp = Present value of the residual value of the investment in year 30 and 
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D = Societal discount rate. 
The basic measure of socio-economic profitability is the benefit-to-cost ratio, which is 
calculated as: 
𝐵
𝐶
=
𝐵𝑝−𝐶𝑝− 𝐶𝑟𝑝+𝑉𝑝
𝐼𝑝
 (4) 
A project is socio-economically profitable if its benefit-to-cost ratio is greater than one. 
Sensitivity analysis with regards to the costs and benefits is done by scenario analysis, while 
the discount rate remains fixed. The sensitivity analysis is performed with regards to all 
uncertain factors that can have a significant impact on the end result and the choice of examined 
factors must be justified in the appraisal report. Common factors assessed in a sensitivity 
analysis are: 
• investment cost, 
• traffic forecasts, 
• assumptions about development of land use and the wider transportation network and 
• time savings. 
The intervals used in the sensitivity analysis must be justified, e.g. uncertainty reported in the 
investment cost estimate must be used to define the intervals for investment cost and sources 
of uncertainty in the traffic forecast may relate to an uncertain population growth forecast, 
uncertainty in the demand estimation method, or the reliance of transport demand on a single 
or few parties. This means that the sensitivity intervals may not be defined arbitrarily. 
(Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011). 
2.1.3. Potential additional benefits 
The FTIA General Appraisal Guide for Transport Infrastructure Projects (Metsäranta & 
Laakso, 2011) defines the wider economic benefits of transport infrastructure projects as 
significant effects that are not included, directly or indirectly, in the direct user benefits. The 
guide recognizes the following as potential sources for wider economic effects:  
• Corporate efficiency benefits in production or use of production inputs resulting from 
more efficient transport, 
• Concentration benefits that flow from increased efficiency due to benefits of scale in 
production or utilization of accumulation factors (e.g. more efficient land use), 
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• Changes in companies’ relative market shares (increased or decreased competition), 
• Expansion or quickening of labor markets, 
• Agglomeration effects = impact of changes in other markets (land, property, housing, 
labor) on the transportation system. 
The probability and magnitude of wider economic benefits is greater in large projects that have 
wide-spread effects on the transportation system or that open traffic bottlenecks. Wider 
economic benefits should not be included in the cost-benefit analysis, but the degree of 
inclusion of these wider economic benefits, if any, in the calculation of direct benefits should 
be assessed. (Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011). 
An important and contemporary reason for examining these wider economic benefits outside 
the established cost-benefit analysis framework is a decision of a parliamentary working group 
on the funding of infrastructure investments, given in February 2018, to recommend broader 
use of the “beneficiary pays” principle in infrastructure funding. According to the FTIA’s 2019 
publication Tie- ja ratahankkeiden kiinteistötaloudelliset vaikutukset ja kunnan rahoitusosuus 
(Economic Impact of Road and Rail Projects on Real Estate and the Financial Contribution of 
the Municipality) (this author’s translation) (Metsäranta et al. 2019), developing national 
transport connections benefits municipalities and private property owners in the form of 
increased land value. While the main principle in the allocation of investment costs is that the 
government is responsible for road and railway costs and municipalities for street costs, and 
this is to remain the basis for funding negotiations, in some cases it may be justifiable to differ 
from the allocation of costs set out in this main principle (Metsäranta et al. 2019). Increases in 
real estate values mainly benefit landowners, who in turn are subject to government or 
municipality level taxes. When a municipality is the landowner-beneficiary of infrastructure 
investments, and the benefits from government-funded infrastructure (paid by all taxpayers) 
flow disproportionately to a single or few municipalities (benefiting the taxpayers in or around 
those municipalities), it may be justifiable to require those municipalities to pay a larger share 
of the infrastructure. This kind of cost allocation model could even enable projects that would 
not be beneficial from a national point of view. 
So far, the beneficiary pays model has been used to collect payments from the cities of Hamina, 
Espoo and Helsinki as well as the state-owned airport manager Finavia in return for building 
railways serving these areas especially (Metsäranta et al. 2019). This payment model could 
potentially be used to fund the two high-speed rail links currently in planning process, Turun 
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Tunnin Juna between Helsinki and Turku and Suomi-Rata between Helsinki and Tampere. 
These rail links have widely been called socio-economically unprofitable (for example Kossila 
& Lehtola, 2019), but at the same time there is a lot of political pressure to build these 
connections. The municipalities along the new connections could use a part of their new 
revenue from increased property and municipal taxes as well as sale of land use rights to fund 
the projects. If the municipalities were unwilling to fund these projects, that could imply that 
they do not themselves believe in the profitability of these investments – thus, this kind of 
financing mechanism could result in public funding being more efficiently allocated to 
profitable projects. 
2.2. Public Infrastructure Investments 
This subchapter provides an overview of the characteristics of public infrastructure investments 
and how they are financed with public and private capital.  
Public investment projects are often characterized by large size (high capital expenditure), a 
long gestation process, low direct monetary returns and high social impact (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002). For example, we may consider public hospitals, schools or transportation network. All 
three are substantial investments, requiring long planning, decision-making, appraisal and 
design periods as well as large amounts of capital. Once completed, they provide citizens with 
vital services that are either free at the point of use or heavily subsidized from public budgets. 
As both the service provider and the payer are typically public sector entities, generating 
financial returns does not play a role while cost efficiency is important. 
These characteristics mean that the social benefits resulting from the project form a large part 
of the cost-benefit analysis of the public sector. Social benefits are non-financial in nature – 
such as public welfare, education and travel times – necessitating public funding from tax 
revenue; for this reason, social infrastructure investments have traditionally been viewed solely 
as public sector projects. The government does contract out functions such as design and 
construction work to private parties but has historically acted as both the funder and the 
financier. This has recently begun to change, however. 
2.2.1. Sources of Financing 
Financing for public infrastructure investments has traditionally come directly from the public 
budget. Government agencies receive their funding from the state as budget authorizations and 
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lack direct access to debt markets; although the government funds budgets partly with 
sovereign debt, from the agencies’ point of view capital structure does not matter – budget 
funding is budget funding. 
The project company model can be used to combine public budget funding with debt financing; 
a public authority injects equity capital into a project company created to manage a single 
investment project and commercial debt is used to a high degree to finance the investment. 
Private equity capital can be employed via several public-private partnership models. In these 
models, the private sector finances the delivery of an asset and the public sector pays for use, 
either by subsidizing a market-based operating model or by funding the operation in full. 
2.2.1.1. Public budgets 
Public investment budgets and sources of public funds 
In Finland, executing public transport infrastructure investments is the responsibility of the 
Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, which receives its funding from the state in form of 
budget authorizations. These budget authorizations are prepared by the Ministry of Finance 
based on spending limits set by the government in the General Government Fiscal Plan and 
annual budgets based on that plan. The General Government Fiscal Plan spans four years, 
corresponding to the length of a parliamentary election cycle, and its allocation between 
administrative sectors is revised annually. (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
Finnish Transport and Communications Agency, Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency & 
Finnish Meteorological Institute, 2019 and Ministry of Finance, 2019a). The state generates its 
revenue mainly from direct and indirect taxation (over 80% of funding) with the rest coming 
from other income including profit distributions of state-owned businesses, sales of state assets 
and public infrastructure user charges. Net borrowing fills for any remaining deficiency. 
(Ministry of Finance, 2019b). 
The budget set for transport infrastructure is split into maintenance investments and separately 
designated development investments. Maintenance investments include routine maintenance, 
use (e.g. lighting expenses), repairs, maintenance, replacement and improvement investments, 
ice breakage, route ferries, traffic management, information and planning. Completely new 
transport infrastructure investments are made from the development investment budget. 
(Ministry of Transport and Communications, Finnish Transport and Communications Agency, 
Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency & Finnish Meteorological Institute, 2019). 
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An important matter to note regarding investment budgets is that the budget places a limit on 
investment expenditure during one budgeting period; while this may sound obvious, it has 
significance for the choice of financing model. If investment costs are paid directly from the 
public investment budget, as in the traditional budget financed procurement model, the full cost 
of the investment must fit into the budget authorization. However, if procuring an infrastructure 
asset as a comprehensive service agreement, as is the case in public private partnership projects, 
only the portion of service payments to be made during the budgeting period must fit into the 
budget authorization (Goebel & Toivonen, 2019). This allows decision makers and the agency 
to effectively “borrow” funds from future budgeting periods in order to start an investment 
project earlier than would otherwise be possible. It should be noted, however, that these long-
term contracts bind future budgets and thus reduce future governments’ authority over 
budgeting (Ronikonmäki, 2019). Government agencies do not have a free hand in signing these 
kinds of long-term contracts and a parliament decision to grant budget authorization to a 
particular project is required in order to commit funds. 
So far it has been established that government agencies receive their funding as budget 
authorizations directly from the state. It follows that from their point of view the capital 
structure used to fund investments does not play a role. However, the state uses debt to finance 
the budgets granted to agencies. Budgeted Finnish public expenditure for 2020 totals 57,7 
billion euros, with public debt totaling just under double that at 110,5 billion at the end of 
February 2020 (Ministry of Finance, 2020 and Treasury of Finland, 2020). Further, the State 
Treasury rolls over (borrows and redeems) 15-20 billion euros of debt annually, around a third 
of the public budget (Ministry of Finance, 2020). Based on the state’s real capital structure, the 
inclusion of capital structure in a comprehensive economic analysis may be justified. 
Public project company model 
One way to introduce capital structure into project evaluation is to apply the project company 
model. In the project company model, a project company is set up by a public authority to 
deliver a single project. In a model where private equity is not employed, the public authority 
funds the project company with a small amount of equity, often in the form of apportioned land 
or existing infrastructure assets. The project company then draws low-cost commercial debt 
secured on the sovereign credit rating to complete financing for the project (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, 2019) and signs contracts with financiers, contractors, etc. as 
required by the project. Funding for debt service and operation may come from user charges 
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or government subsidies, in the case of Finnish transport infrastructure the source is typically 
the latter.  
2.2.1.2. Private capital 
Background on private financing 
According to Grimsey and Lewis (2002), government has been the principal provider of 
infrastructure, at least outside the U.S., from at least the post-war period until the very end of 
the twentieth century. During the 1990s governments in developed economies started facing 
pressures to reduce public debt while simultaneously being called on to improve public 
services. This combined with other contemporary phenomena such as the rapid development 
of the financial markets, advanced investment vehicles and market demand for investments 
with steady return profiles have resulted in private sector finance taking a role in the financing 
of public infrastructure (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). As traditional financial markets have 
become more competitive, investors have been incentivized to enter into new market sectors 
that require different kinds of expertise and value-added services (PwC, 2019): public private 
partnerships (PPPs) and other collaborations of private financiers and public procuring 
authorities. 
In Finland, public authorities contract out design, construction, operation and maintenance 
work of public infrastructure investments to private parties, with few state companies 
remaining in these industries. However, the funding and financing of state-owned projects has 
historically come from the state. This chapter explores the relatively recent trend of using 
private capital to finance public investments. The public private partnership is so far the only 
private financing model used in Finland, hence most of the literature review will focus on PPPs. 
Past 
There have been individual concessions granted by public authorities to private parties since at 
least the 18th century, but widespread use of a procurement model where the public sector pays 
a private party to provide public services is a rather recent phenomenon. According to Grimsey 
and Lewis (2002), the first concession was granted to the French Périer brothers in 1782 
concerning water distribution; the company built and operated the infrastructure to deliver 
drinking water to the city of Paris and the city paid the brothers for using the system. A 
privatized tunnel was discussed almost two centuries later in late 1950s in Hong Kong 
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(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002), this went ahead later in 1965 as a shared venture between private 
(80%) and public (20%) ownership (The Cross-Harbour (Holdings), 2005). 
Widespread participation of the private sector in public infrastructure provision started in 
1980s. According to Grimsey & Lewis (2002), the Commonwealth countries were the first to 
adopt systematic use of private financing, with Australia public/private sector infrastructure 
arrangements put in place in 1988 and UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes introduced 
in 1992. According to Brealey, Cooper and Habib (1996) the UK PFI schemes were utilized 
soon after their introduction to build and operate schools, hospitals and prisons. Privatizations 
and project finance have been the two principal ways of utilizing private capital in the UK 
model. National telecommunication networks have been widely privately operated, while 
especially in developing countries private companies have been founded to provide power 
generation locally (Brealey, Cooper & Habib, 1996).  
In Finland private capital has so far only been employed to finance roads. Rail and hospital 
projects have been planned as PPP projects in the cities of Kokkola and Espoo, respectively, 
and reached the procurement process, but the Kokkola rail project was cancelled in 2011 and 
the Espoo hospital project was eventually procured as a design/build project due to the City of 
Espoo not receiving satisfactory offers for the PPP procurement. (Inframation Deals). 
The first Finnish public private partnership (PPP) project was the E4 Helsinki-Lahti Motorway. 
The deal was closed in 1997, motorway opened to traffic in 1999 and the 15-year service period 
ended in 2012, with the project company Tieyhtiö Nelostie Oy handing the road over to The 
Finnish Transport Agency (Liikennevirasto) (now The Finnish Transport Infrastructure 
Agency (Väylävirasto)) (Yle 1999, 2012). The public private partnership model has since been 
used in three other motorway projects, E18 Muurla-Lohjanharju (2005), E18 Koskenkylä-
Kotka (2011) and E18 Hamina-Vaalimaa (2015).  
Present 
According to the European Court of Auditors (2018), 1 749 contracts for PPP projects have 
been closed in the EU since the 1990s, with a total worth of 336 billion euro. In 2016, transport 
projects accounted for one third of the years’ investment, ahead of healthcare and education 
(European Court of Auditors, 2018). Transport infrastructure is indeed a natural fit for PPP 
projects especially in countries where road tolls are used, as this toll revenue can be used to 
cover the state’s service payment obligation to the service provider – with revenue-generating 
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projects the private sector has in some cases assumed demand risk, although this results in the 
service provider’s need to price that risk. As a private company that operates a road has few 
ways to influence the road users’ demand for that road, compensating the service provider for 
carrying demand risk is seldom efficient use of public funds. 
In Finland there have not yet been privately financed public projects in sectors other than 
transport infrastructure.  A law change in 2018 extended to municipalities certain legal 
exemptions concerning corporate taxation of companies delivering projects under a 
comprehensive service agreement, that formerly applied only to road and rail projects procured 
by the state (Parliament of Finland, 2018 and Ministry of Finance, 2018). This change enabled 
municipalities to procure contracts for projects as comprehensive services that include private 
financing. Immediately after the change, in December 2018, the City of Espoo launched the 
procurement process for the construction and maintenance over 20 years of a bundle of four 
schools, to be carried out under a single PPP project agreement (Inframation Deals). This marks 
both the first non-government agency and the first education PPP project in Finland. The 
procurement process has reached the final negotiations process, with a consortium of Finnish 
construction company YIT and French private equity investor Meridiam chosen as the service 
provider (Gallivan, R, 2019). 
Future 
Public debt levels of developed countries remain high, although on a slightly downward trend 
(Eurostat, 2020) at least in Europe. Private investors, financiers and construction companies, 
as well as other main parties included in outsourcing contracts for public assets are becoming 
more familiar with these types of arrangements as their use has proliferated across different 
geographical markets and business sectors. According to a 2018 fundraising report by Preqin, 
the capital amounts raised by infrastructure funds continued to increase in 2018, with early 
indicators showing 2019 to become another record year (Preqin, 2018). This increase in fund 
subscription shows that there is mutual demand for infrastructure private equity both from the 
public sector and private investors. Further, according to an article by PwC Corporate Finance 
(2019), private infrastructure investors are increasingly willing to invest in minority interest 
positions, relinquishing control over the asset in return for a steady and predictable return. This 
could allow the public sector to receive the benefit of private financing while still maintaining 
control over the public asset, freeing up public capital to other investments or decreasing public 
debt levels. The same article finds that infrastructure investors have taken a more active stance 
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on the traditionally passive asset class, offering ancillary services along fixed infrastructure 
assets and thus expanding the definition of the infrastructure asset class (PwC, 2019). The 
ancillary services referred to here could be something as simple as offering facility services to 
office space lessees, or something as comprehensive as investing in project companies 
engaging in public private partnership agreements with the public sector – providing a full 
design, build, finance, operation and maintenance package of public infrastructure assets. 
Based on these findings, the role of private capital in public infrastructure seems likely to grow 
in the future. 
Benefits and drawbacks of private capital 
Private capital has enabled many projects which would not otherwise have taken place. 
Increasing public debt levels, especially in developed economies, have forced the authorities 
to prioritize and consider which projects to procure with public funds (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2002). Khanna et al. (2018) note that very high public debt levels in many economies limit 
governments’ ability to invest, particularly in infrastructure, when investments are needed to 
support continued economic growth. The authors site realistic book revaluations of public 
assets as a potential source for financing their further development and maintenance (Khanna 
et al. 2018). As long as the investments made with private capital produce socio-economic 
benefits that return increased tax revenue, using private financing to augment public sector 
investment capacity can be justified. Because the investment costs are not paid up front in a 
PPP model but are instead spread out over the life of the asset, the financial return (increased 
tax revenue, reduced costs to the public) can be used to amortize the costs over the life of the 
project. 
Public private partnership agreements place the private capital at risk; the procuring authority 
makes service payments to the service provider in return for the agreed service. If the service 
provider fails to deliver the service, or the service is not up to the agreed standards, the capital 
may be lost. The service provider thus has a better incentive to design, build, operate and 
maintain the project prudently than would be the case in a project where the contractor receives 
the full payment upon delivery of the asset. Using inferior construction materials to save on 
costs or employing the bare minimum number of staff, for example, could increase the 
probability of service payment deductions, resulting in a net loss for the service provider. 
Further, the PPP project companies (special purpose vehicles) are typically highly levered, with 
up to 90:10 debt-to-equity ratios being common for infrastructure projects in developed 
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markets (Inframation Deals, APMG International, 2019). The leverage further incentivizes the 
service provider to perform, as the lenders commonly have recourse to (at least some of) the 
owners of the project company who are then vulnerable to losses considerably above their 
invested capital. 
Using private capital to finance investments when public sector debt is near unmanageable 
levels can lead to exceeding the public sector’s capacity to service its financial obligations. If 
PPP arrangements are viewed by the state as enabling projects without increasing reported 
levels of public debt, this may incentivize the government to take on politically popular but 
socio-economically unprofitable projects, contributing further to a weak financial condition. 
Many countries, Finland included, treat financial liabilities from PPP contracts equivalently to 
public debt, and Eurostat regulations have required European Union Member States to do so 
by from 2004 if the state carries the construction, availability or demand risk associated with 
the project (IMF, 2004). Countries outside the European Union, however, have different 
practices and may only list the annual service payments as expenses, without acknowledging 
the remaining liability. 
Private capital is almost always more expensive than public financing. Leviäkangas et al. 
(2016) find that the public sector in practice does not adjust their investment analyses for risk, 
while the private sector follows great care in doing so. A private company must earn a financial 
return on its owners’ capital, while the public sector uses tax revenue to fund investments that 
result in socio-economic benefits to the public. While the contracting public authority can 
influence the size of the maximum return to the private investors by negotiating the size of the 
service payments, it must allow a reasonable equity return in order to attract the capital in the 
first place. This equity cost disadvantage is somewhat alleviated by the high leverage ratios of 
the PPP project companies; however, it should be noted that the cost of debt is almost always 
higher to a private company than to the public sector (e.g. IMF, 2004). 
There has been a lot of discussion about the “right” or “reasonable” cost of equity in public 
sector projects using private financing. Leviäkangas et al. (2016) find that the risk-adjusted 
returns of PPP service providers have been substantially higher than those of public investors. 
Whitfield & Smyth (2018) note that as equity transactions concerning PPP project companies 
are private, there is scarce information available and this makes it very difficult to assess equity 
returns. However, they do find a substantial transaction volume in UK project company equity 
stakes, suggesting the returns make equity stakes attractive in the secondary market. Grimsey 
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& Lewis (2002) note that PPP project risk varies greatly depending on the specific project and 
is in principle not very different from private sector projects. However, a report by the 
European Court of Auditors found that, in 12 projects audited across different European Union 
Member States, risk allocation between the public and private sector was often inappropriate 
and ineffective, while the private equity investors earned returns of up to 14%, far out of line 
with the risks borne by the investors (Herics et al. 2018). 
Provision of public services by the private sector has been justified by efficiency advantages 
of the private sector (e.g. IMF, 2004 and Herics et al. 2018). It is believed that, given 
appropriate incentives, private service providers can provide services with greater efficiency 
than the public sector, and thus it would make sense to pay private companies to provide the 
services using public funds. Further, public private partnership agreements allow risks 
associated with the service provision to be contractually transferred to the private service 
provider. This is especially beneficial in cases where a completely new infrastructure asset is 
being built, such as a road, a hospital or some other long-term fixed asset. Typically, in PPP 
service agreements the client (a public authority) has a contractual right to withhold payment 
upon a failure in adequate service provision and hence the private service provider will have 
strong incentives to ensure high levels of design, construction and service quality. As the same 
party is responsible for both the design of the asset as well as its maintenance and operation, it 
is in that party’s interest to design the asset in the most efficient way possible in order to 
minimize costs and maximize returns.  
Despite the sound theoretical reasoning behind public private partnerships, research on past 
projects has found mixed results with regards to efficiency and cost savings. Leviäkangas 
(2007, Leviäkangas et al. 2016) found that, in the case of Finland’s first road PPP (E4 Helsinki-
Lahti motorway) the project was delivered well ahead of the planned schedule and has 
performed very well, with high maintenance quality and few disruptions, but in the long run 
the state paid more than it would have with a traditional procurement. European Court of 
Auditors finds that most European PPP projects have been subject to considerable construction 
delays and cost overruns, although those projects displayed good levels of service and 
maintenance once completed. For most of the projects audited by the group no comparative 
analysis was made prior to choosing PPP as the procurement model, which may partly explain 
the subpar efficiency in these cases. (Herics et al. 2018).  
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To summarize, it seems that employing private capital can lead to high service and maintenance 
quality, but public sector oversight and prudent contracting is required to avoid cost overruns. 
Private capital has a considerable cost disadvantage compared to public funding, and it remains 
unclear whether operational efficiency benefits can exceed additional capital costs. One 
significant advantage of private capital, mentioned earlier in the previous subchapter on public 
budgets, is that it can often be used to fund investments when public funding is not available; 
as Leviäkangas (2007) argues, for projects with high socio-economic benefits private capital 
can be used to start the project sooner than public investment budgets would allow. In such 
cases the comparison is no longer between public and private financing, but between private 
financing and no (or delayed) project. 
Sources of private capital 
Private equity capital can be employed in public projects using several different procurement 
models with different levels of private and public sector participation. A distinction should be 
made regarding the term public private partnership; it is considered an umbrella term for any 
public-private collaborative financing model, but also has an established meaning referring to 
a model built around a privately-owned project company that receives service payments from 
the public sector once the asset is delivered and operational; the latter meaning will be used in 
this paper. Three common internationally used private financing models are the regulated asset 
base (RAB), the concession model and the public private partnership; of these, the public 
private partnership is the most relevant for Finland and will be covered in most detail.  
According to Briggs (2019), in the regulated asset base (RAB) model the rate of return of the 
private party delivering and/or maintaining the public asset is regulated, as the name implies. 
In a greenfield investment, the procuring public authority determines a target cost for the 
project and invites tenders for the weighted average cost of capital (WACC); the party that is 
willing to accept the lowest WACC wins the tender competition. The private party will then 
finance, build and manage the asset and is compensated by the public authority so that the 
agreed return is achieved. The private party is partly accountable for any overspend with 
regards to the target cost, while being partly compensated for cost savings. In a brownfield 
project (e.g. privatization of an asset), the return basis will be linked to the price of the asset 
upon flotation (market value). (Briggs, 2019). According to Briggs (2019) and Forsdick (2019), 
in the RAB model the private contractor is paid already during the construction of the asset, 
and thus it enables the financing of capital-intensive, long-term projects using private capital. 
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However, since the contractor is only accountable for a part of any overspend, the model has 
been criticized for providing an “open cheque book” for the private sector and exposing the 
public authority to considerable cost risk (Briggs, 2019 and Forsdick, 2019). 
According to the World Bank (2018) and Kuntaliitto (Association of Finnish Municipalities) 
(2019), in the concession model a private party is awarded a concession to manage an 
infrastructure system for a predetermined time period. The concession may include the private 
party taking over existing assets from the public authority (brownfield) or the design, build, 
financing, operation and maintenance (DBFOM) of a new asset (greenfield). The model can 
effectively be considered a narrow-scope monopoly granted to a private party for management 
of a certain piece of infrastructure. The private party typically carries all risks associated with 
the project, including demand risk, and receives all or most of its return in the form of user 
payments (World Bank, 2018 and Kuntaliitto, 2019). The concessionaire (private party) 
typically pays a periodical concession fee to the public authority, but in some cases the public 
authority may pay subsidies to the concessionaire. These cases may include infrastructure with 
insufficient market demand or the need to keep user charges low for social reasons. The 
concession model has been employed in Finland, for example in arranging public 
transportation. According to the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications (2006, 
2012), private transport operators are awarded concessions to operate certain predetermined 
routes and depending on the route their compensation and service pricing may be market-based 
or contract-based (Ministry of Transport and Communications, 2006 and 2012). Using the 
concession model for procuring large infrastructure assets is problematic, as the construction 
and demand risks tend to result in high risk pricing by the concessionaire and financiers. The 
risk pricing issue could be alleviated if the public authority were to contractually assume some 
of the risks, but other procurement models are more suitable for large infrastructure projects. 
According to Carter et al. (2017), in a public private partnership (PPP) model, also called the 
Build-Operate-Transfer model, a private service provider is responsible for completing design 
and construction, raising private financing for the project and maintaining the completed asset 
for a relatively long agreement period, typically 15-20 years according to the European Court 
of Auditors (2018). The service provider is compensated in the form of service payments, 
which may be based on availability, performance or use of the asset or a combination of these. 
The payment basis depends on the risk allocation agreed in the contract, with availability and 
performance basis utilized when demand risk is borne by the public authority and user volume 
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serving as the basis for payments when the demand risk is on the service provider. (Carter et 
al. 2017). 
PPP model structure is based around a special purpose vehicle (SPV), often called a project 
company, set up by a private company or consortium of companies, that serves as the service 
provider to the public authority. The project company enters into an agreement with the public 
authority for delivery and maintenance of the asset and signs agreements with private 
contractors for construction, financing, maintenance, etc. An illustration of the SPV structure 
can be seen in figure 1. (Leviäkangas, 2016). 
As seen in the diagram, all agreements 
between the public and the private sector 
are signed by the Project company. The 
State has an agreement with the Project 
company (“service provider”) for delivery 
and maintenance of the asset or provision 
of a service. In Finnish PPPs, the State 
compensates the Project company for 
provision of the service in the form of service payments, conditional on availability and 
performance or realized use of the asset, while no agreement exists between Users and the 
Project company. The Project company pays corporate taxes on its revenue, thus decreasing 
the effective net cost to the State.  
In case of fixed infrastructure, the main contractor under Contractors & Suppliers would be a 
large construction company, with the rest typically being its subcontractors. The main 
contractor (construction company) is almost always also an Equity Investor, though most of 
the equity typically comes from private equity funds. Debt typically comes from one or more 
commercial banks as well as special credit institutions (European Investment Bank, Nordic 
Investment Bank in the Nordics) and is secured against future cash flows of the project 
company. The future cash flows of the Project company, service payments from the State, are 
conditional on performance of the asset, resulting in significantly higher risks to Debt Investors 
and thus higher cost of debt than in the public project company model, where the State provides 
direct security; this is one of the main disadvantages of the PPP model. 
The Project company builds and maintains the asset according to the service agreement with 
the State, uses its service payment cash flow to service obligations to Debt Investors and 
distribute equity payouts (dividends, interest on shareholder loans, etc.) to its Equity Investors. 
Figure 1. Illustration of a single project company ecosystem 
(Leviäkangas, 2016). 
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At the end of the agreement period, the asset is handed over to the State and the Project 
company is dissolved. 
2.3. Return Requirements of Public and Private Investors 
This subchapter examines how the public sector and private investors set their return 
requirements for infrastructure investments. The public sector values future socio-economic 
benefits using the societal discount rate, while the private sector sets its equity return 
requirement at a level that provides a reasonable compensation for placing their capital at risk. 
Private companies must compete for their investors’ capital with other investment 
opportunities, so their primary goal is to produce competitive financial returns for those 
investors, and they must generally make do with fewer financial resources than governments. 
On the other hand, the primary goal of the public sector is to maintain core infrastructure and 
services for the society, and funding comes primarily from tax revenue. This means that 
financial returns are less important and resources less limited, while social welfare is important. 
2.3.1. Societal discount rate 
How public authorities determine their discount factors varies between countries and between 
industry sectors. According to the FTIA General Appraisal Guide for Transport Infrastructure 
Projects, the societal discount factor used by the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency is 
based on a near-risk free return (such as government bonds of a state with a high credit rating) 
and a societal risk premium (Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011): 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 (5), where 
𝑟𝑓 = long-term risk-free return and 
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = a country-specific risk premium consisting of the pure rate of time 
preferences and the risk of disaster.  
The societal risk premium has no absolute reference value; the prevailing view is that it must 
be considerably lower than corporate discount rates because there is no risk of bankruptcy or 
significant asset value amortization associated with public projects (Metsäranta & Laakso, 
2011). The societal risk premium and its components are based on the recommendation of the 
Swedish transport authority, Trafikverket. 
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Trafikverket uses a slightly different method for calculating the societal discount rate. Instead 
of the long-term risk-free return, their model incorporates the elasticity of the marginal utility 
of consumption and the growth of consumption per capita (Bångman, G. & Nordlöf, P. 2018): 
𝑖 = 𝑧 + 𝑛𝑔, where 
𝑖 = societal discount rate, 
𝑧 = the pure rate of time preferences + the risk of disaster, 
𝑛 = the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and 
𝑔 = the rate of growth of consumption per capita. 
The pure rate of time preferences of the public sector is affected by pure impatience; benefits 
now are worth more than benefits tomorrow - and by the uncertainty of the value of certain 
types of benefits in the future; for example, the utility received from convenient transportation 
may be less valuable in the future e.g. due to increase in working and shopping from home 
(these kinds of major societal changes are realistic during the long project appraisal periods). 
The risk of disaster accounts for the possibility that the asset is destroyed before the expected 
benefits are received (e.g. due to war or a natural disaster). 
For the combination of pure rate of time preferences and the risk of disaster as well as the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, Trafikverket uses values determined by the 
working group HEATCO (Bickel et al. 2006) (Developing Harmonised European Approaches 
for Transport Costing and Project Assessment). HEATCO recommends 1,5 as the value of z, 
while the recommended base value for the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption n 
is 0,7 and sensitivity testing with 1,0 is recommended. For rate of growth of consumption per 
capita g, a country-specific annual growth estimate of 1,8 percent is used. (Bångman, G. & 
Nordlöf, P. 2018 and Bickel et al. 2006). 
The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption means that as per capita consumption 
grows, the utility of consumers increases by n times the growth; this calculation thus 
approximates the welfare loss that would result from increasing taxation to fund an investment 
and is hence considered an appropriate measure for appraising the net utility gain from public 
investments (which are ultimately paid for by the taxpayers). 
The n and g are disregarded in the Finnish model, while the pure rate of time preferences and 
the risk of disaster form the societal risk premium. The reference values provided in the 2011 
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FTIA General Appraisal Guide for Transport Infrastructure Projects for each of these two 
factors is 2,0% (Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011), higher than the HEATCO recommendation. This 
may have been increased to partly account for the omission of n and g. At the time of 
publication of the 2011 guide, the discount rate recommended by the Finnish Transport Agency 
was (2% + 2%) = 4%. This was decreased to 3,5% (without disclosing changes in the 
constituents) in the 2013 update of the Appraisal Guide for Road Projects (Ristikartano, 
Iikkanen & Mukula, 2013). Based on the development of the cost of public debt during those 
years, it seems likely that the decrease was due to a decrease in the risk-free rate. Hence the 
societal risk premium component seems to have remained at 2,0% since 2011. 
As the analysis performed in this study is intended to represent the public decision-makers’ 
point of view, the current societal discount rate of 3,5% will be used in the financial models to 
discount socio-economic costs and benefits to the present. 
2.3.2. Cost of equity in public private partnerships 
As noted in section 2.3.2, private equity financing is considerably more expensive than public 
financing. As noted by Whitfield & Smyth (2018), there exists little public information about 
realized equity returns in public private partnerships. However, in case of infrastructure 
investments, reported target returns of unlisted infrastructure investment funds present a 
suitable proxy, as large equity funds do invest in public private partnership equity stakes (e.g. 
Meridiam infrastructure fund invested in the Espoo four schools PPP in 2019 (Gallivan, 2019)). 
According to Preqin’s 2015 report on European infrastructure fund performance, 60% of 
unlisted infrastructure funds target an equity IRR of 12,5% or less, while 34% target an IRR 
between 10% and 12,5% (Preqin, 2015). This leaves 26% of the funds targeting a return of less 
than 10%. Deloitte reports target and actual IRRs of European infrastructure funds as most 
commonly being between 10% and 12%, down from the 12% to 14% range in their 2013 
review. Deloitte cites increased competition as a major cause for the decrease. (Deloitte, 2016). 
Investment-specific characteristics are likely to determine the return requirement of a specific 
investment within this range. According to the Hailuoto Causeway Project Appraisal report 
(Soisalo et al. 2018), the Hailuoto Causeway project consists of building a causeway and two 
bridges in a marine environment, in the vicinity of an environmentally sensitive protected area. 
Marine projects of this scale are uncommon in Finland and contractors can reasonably be 
expected to have relatively little experience with them, so the project can be expected to carry 
more risk than an average road project, but likely still less than a hospital or a nuclear power 
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plant project. Failures in service provision could entitle the client (the FTIA) to service payment 
deductions, while incidents during construction near the protected environment could 
potentially result in additional liabilities, causing financial risks to the PPP service provider. 
On the other hand, counterparty risk, meaning the risk that the contracting authority defaults 
on its payment obligations, is very low as the counterparty is effectively the Finnish state (credit 
rating AA+/Aa1) (State Treasury of Finland, 2020).  
Considering these factors, a private equity return requirement of 10% will be used as a baseline 
parameter in the PPP model. This is near the middle of the range provided in the reports by 
Preqin (2015) and Deloitte (2016). Due to limited data on realized equity returns in PPP 
investments, the cost of equity will be an important factor of interest in the sensitivity analysis.
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3. Research Questions 
3.1. Effect of Project Finance on the socio-economic profitability of the Hailuoto 
Causeway project 
Cost-benefit analysis used to evaluate Finnish public infrastructure investments compares 
projects based on their direct socio-economic costs and benefits, discounted to the year of 
project completion using the societal discount rate. The analysis does not include evaluation of 
potential financing arrangements, instead project costs are implicitly assumed to be paid when 
the asset is ready for use, while the benefits produced by the project are received later. 
Evaluating potential financing arrangements already in the project appraisal phase can add 
valuable information for decision makers. By using external financing, the investment cost can 
be spread out over the life of the project instead of being paid when the project is ready for use, 
so that the costs are amortized as the benefits are received. Using external capital to finance 
the investment increases the nominal total cost of the project, but as long as the cost of debt is 
lower than the societal discount rate (as has been the case for most Northern European 
governments for more than a decade), the present value of costs will decrease while the benefits 
remain the same. 
I build three financial models to test the effects of different project finance arrangements on 
the socio-economic profitability of the Hailuoto Causeway project. I use data from the Hailuoto 
Causeway Road Plan to replicate the annual socio-economic cost and benefit flows of the 
project over its 30-year appraisal period, then build the first model where the investment costs 
are assumed to be paid when they are incurred during construction. This model, referred to in 
this study as the Direct Budget Financing model, serves as a base case. The second is the Project 
Company model, where a project company is assumed to be set up by the public sector to 
finance and manage the project. The public-sector owned project company will finance the 
project with low-cost debt secured on the sovereign credit rating and amortize the investment 
cost during the 30-year appraisal period. The third is the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
model, where the whole project is assumed to be contracted out to a private party as a 
comprehensive service agreement. In this model a private service provider will build the 
causeway and manage it during the 30-year appraisal period, while the public authority pays 
an annual service payment for use of the asset. The PPP model has been chosen as the actual 
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financing model of the Hailuoto Causeway project (Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, 
2020). 
Using these three financial models, I examine the following research questions: 
1. Using project finance to defer negative cash flows into the future should improve the 
benefit-to-cost ratio, economic rate of return and economic net present value of the 
Hailuoto Causeway project. 
1.1. The relative advantage of project finance should increase with the societal discount 
rate. 
1.2. The relative advantage of project finance should increase with length of the investment 
period. 
1.3. The relative advantage of project finance should decrease as the reference interest rate 
increases. 
1.4. Performance of the PPP model should decrease as the cost of equity increases. 
1.5. Performance of the PPP model should improve as the private sector efficiency 
advantage increases. 
3.2. Expediting project start with Off-budget Financing 
As described earlier, the public sector can use procurement models employing private financing 
to effectively “borrow” funds from future budgets and start a project earlier than public 
investment budgets would allow. Doing so reduces the budget available in future periods but 
can result in net cost savings when used to finance projects with large enough financial benefits. 
The Hailuoto Causeway is projected to result in net cost savings to the public sector, as the 
annual service payment paid to the service provider should be substantially lower than the 
annual cost of the ferry service currently in place. 
I examine the following research question using the Direct Budget Financing and PPP models: 
2. Using a procurement model employing private equity financing to expedite project start 
should improve the benefit-to-cost ratio, economic rate of return and economic net present 
value of the Hailuoto Causeway project compared to delaying investment until sufficient 
budget is available. 
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4. Data 
4.1. Hailuoto Causeway Project Appraisal Report 
The official Hailuoto Causeway Road Plan forms the main part of data used in this study. The 
road plan includes a project appraisal report that has been completed according to the 
guidelines of the Finnish Transport Infrastructure Agency, detailed in chapter 2.1. 
In accordance with the guidelines, three investment options were explored:  
• Do-minimum scenario (Option 0) where the ferry connection between the mainland and 
Hailuoto is maintained at the current service level. 
• Scenario where the service level of the ferry connection is improved by increasing 
service frequency and running the ferry around the clock (currently the ferry does not 
run during nighttime) (option 0+), 
• Building a fixed connection using a causeway and two bridges (option 1). 
The appraisal period for benefits and costs is 2021-2051, with a construction period of two 
years. This means that investment costs are incurred in 2019 and 2020, while 2021 serves as 
the base year (year 0). 
Benefits of the chosen option 1 are reported as marginal improvements (or impairments) over 
option 0. Benefits are estimated over the appraisal period, discounted to year 0 using the current 
societal discount rate, 3,5% and reported in 2017 price level. Time, accident and emissions 
costs (reported as positive/negative benefits) are indexed by 1,125% annually from year 0. 
To transfer project costs into year 0, interest accrued during construction is calculated to 
compensate for the period capital is tied up in the project. Like benefits, costs are also reported 
in 2017 price level. 
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Table 1. Cost-benefit summary of Hailuoto Causeway. Source: Hailuoto Causeway Road Plan (Soisalo et al. 2018). 
 
The costs and benefits of the Hailuoto Causeway (option 1) over maintaining the current ferry 
service (option 0) can be seen in Table 1. Majority of the benefits (over 80%) come from Route 
administrator expenses, as the ferry service (annual cost of 5,8 MEUR in 2017 price level) can 
be discontinued and replaced with basic road maintenance (estimated annual cost of 0,3 MEUR 
in 2017 price level). 
The second-largest benefit comes from User travel costs; travel times are cut significantly, 
while vehicle costs for road users are increased (negative benefit). Unlike maintenance costs, 
which are a direct benefit to the FTIA and only indirectly affect the public via reduced public 
spending, time costs are a direct benefit to the public. Increasing vehicle costs negate a part of 
the benefit, but the tax portion of that cost increase goes back to public sector benefits. 
Impact on public finances is the third largest benefit; this comprises fuel tax and value added 
tax on fuel paid by private persons. These taxes are reported separately as they can be estimated 
Costs 
(Cost index of civil engineering works 111,7; 2010=100) 76,4
Design and planning 0,5
Construction 73,33
Interest accrued during construction 2,57
Indirect and avoided investments 0
Benefits 125,12
Route administrator expenses 102,91
Maintenance costs 102,91
User travel costs 9,24
Time costs 22,86
Vehicle costs (incl. taxes) -13,62
Transport costs 1,51
Time costs 5,42
Vehicle costs (incl. taxes) -3,91
Effect on safety -3,96
Accident costs -3,96
Environmental impact 4,83
Emissions costs 4,83
Noise costs 0
Impact on public finances 7,16
Fuel tax and VAT 7,16
Residual value 7,1
Residual value at end of appraisal period 7,10
Disadvantages during construction -3,67
Benefit-to-Cost ratio 1,64
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with a reasonable accuracy; vehicle taxes are reported together with other vehicle costs as they 
cannot be reliably separated from other costs. (Soisalo et al. 2018). 
4.1.1. Data treatment 
The project appraisal report provides the socio-economic costs and benefits by item as total 
present values over the 30-year appraisal period (see Table 1. in the previous subchapter). In 
order to determine the nominal annual values, I build a model where the costs and benefits are 
distributed on a timeline defined according to the cost-benefit analysis guidelines, with 
construction costs and negative construction period benefits (disadvantages during 
construction in Table 1.) occurring during years t-2 – t-1 and benefits during years to – t30. The 
societal discount rate used in the report, 3,50%, is used to calculate annual nominal values from 
the reported present values over the 30-year appraisal period, using the built-in goal seek 
iterative function in Microsoft Excel to find the nominal total. 
After finding the annual nominal costs and benefits, I make several adjustments to the data to 
make it more suitable for financial modelling.  
First, in the report Maintenance costs are reported as savings of option 1 (causeway) over 
option 0 (ferry). The maintenance costs of the causeway are estimated to be 0,3 MEUR 
annually. This 0,3 MEUR is added back to maintenance cost savings (increasing the absolute 
value of benefits), while a corresponding amount is added as an annual expense (adding a cost 
item to the timeline). 
Second, I redefine the base year, t0, as the year of construction start. In the cost-benefit analysis 
year to is set to the year of project completion and opening-to-traffic. Treating the year of 
opening-to-traffic as year to should make projects with different investment period lengths 
more comparable, as the investment period length will only affect the interest accrued during 
construction and not the discount factors used to discount benefits produced by the project. 
However, this study focuses on the effects of project finance arrangements in the context of a 
single project and tests the effects with different investment period lengths. Thus, redefining 
year to as the time the investment is started, as is common practice in financial analysis, 
facilitates assessing the behavior of different project finance arrangements when the time 
between financing drawdown and receiving benefits changes. 
Third, as this study’s base case model (direct budget financing) assumes that investment costs 
are paid as incurred during the construction period, the item interest accrued during 
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construction is not used in the models built for this study. To define the base cost for the 
causeway asset, the interest accrued during construction reported in Table 1. is added to 
construction costs, resulting in total construction costs of [73,33 + 2,57 = 75,9 MEUR]. The 
interest cost is added to the construction costs because they are reported in the original year to 
of the project appraisal report. The interest cost item compensates for discounting the 
construction costs to this study’s year to, which is year t-2 of the appraisal report. 
Fourth, the appraisal report and the General Appraisal Guide for Transport Infrastructure 
Projects (Metsäranta & Laakso, 2011) state that the appraisal period for an infrastructure 
project is 30 years. The appraisal report also states that the appraisal period (benefit estimation 
period after construction) is from 2021 to 2051, which is actually 31 years. It is not clear how 
this is addressed in the report’s background calculations. I set the timeline in my financial 
models to years t0 to t31, with the construction period spanning t0 to t1 and the operating period 
from t2 to t30 and assume that the reported benefits accrue in 30 years. The same assumption is 
made for all three financial models and should thus have no effect on the results of this study. 
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Table 2. displays the annual discounted costs and benefits iterated based on the reported totals, their timing (construction costs in years -2 to -1, 
benefits in 0 to 30, residual value in 30) and the discount rate used (3,5%). Table 3. displays the nominal annual costs and benefits after data 
treatment; an additional cost line item is added for maintenance costs and the timeline is compressed to 32 years (two-year investment period and 
30-year appraisal period). The results for the financial models are calculated based on these annual socio-economic cost and benefit flows, adding 
financing costs (Project Company and PPP) and management overhead as well as deducting a possible efficiency advantage factor (PPP).
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Project phase Investment Investment Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation
Costs 85,40 38,45 37,95 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30
Design and planning 0,5 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Construction 73,33 36,67 36,67 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Interest accrued during construction 2,57 1,29 1,29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Indirect and avoided investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maintenance costs 9 0,00 0,00 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30
Benefits 214,94 -1,74 -1,74 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 6,62 26,54
Route administrator expenses 173,51 0,00 0,00 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78
Maintenance costs 173,51 0,00 0,00 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78 5,78
User travel costs 9,92 0,00 0,00 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33 0,33
Time costs 31,69 0,00 0,00 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06
Vehicle costs (incl. taxes) -21,77 0,00 0,00 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73 -0,73
Transport costs 2,41 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08
Time costs 8,66 0,00 0,00 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29
Vehicle costs (incl. taxes) -6,25 0,00 0,00 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21 -0,21
Effect on safety -5,49 0,00 0,00 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18
Accident costs -5,49 0,00 0,00 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18 -0,18
Environmental impact 6,70 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22
Emissions costs 6,70 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,22
Noise costs 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Impact on public finances 11,45 0,00 0,00 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38
Fuel tax and VAT 11,45 0,00 0,00 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38 0,38
Residual value 19,93 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 19,93
Residual value at end of appraisal period 19,93 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 19,93
Disadvantages during construction -3,48 -1,74 -1,74 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Benefit-to-Cost ratio 2,52
Table 3. Annual nominal costs and benefits after data treatment detailed in subchapter 4.1.1 (note additional cost item line for Maintenance costs.) 
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Project phase Investment Investment Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation Operation
Costs 
(Cost index of civil engineering works 111,7; 2010=100) 76,4 38,45 37,95 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Design and planning 0,5 0,50 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Construction 73,33 36,67 36,67 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Interest accrued during construction 2,57 1,29 1,29 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Indirect and avoided investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Benefits 125,12 -1,87 -1,80 6,11 5,92 5,73 5,55 5,37 5,20 5,03 4,87 4,72 4,57 4,42 4,28 4,15 4,01 3,89 3,76 3,65 3,53 3,42 3,31 3,21 3,10 3,01 2,91 2,82 2,73 2,65 2,56 2,48 2,40 9,43
Route administrator expenses 102,91 0,00 0,00 5,31 5,13 4,95 4,79 4,62 4,47 4,32 4,17 4,03 3,89 3,76 3,63 3,51 3,39 3,28 3,17 3,06 2,96 2,86 2,76 2,67 2,58 2,49 2,41 2,32 2,25 2,17 2,10 2,03 1,96 1,89
Maintenance costs 102,91 0,00 0,00 5,31 5,13 4,95 4,79 4,62 4,47 4,32 4,17 4,03 3,89 3,76 3,63 3,51 3,39 3,28 3,17 3,06 2,96 2,86 2,76 2,67 2,58 2,49 2,41 2,32 2,25 2,17 2,10 2,03 1,96 1,89
User travel costs 9,24 0,00 0,00 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,32 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,31 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,30 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,28 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,26 0,26
Time costs 22,86 0,00 0,00 1,02 1,00 0,98 0,95 0,93 0,91 0,89 0,87 0,85 0,83 0,81 0,79 0,77 0,76 0,74 0,72 0,71 0,69 0,67 0,66 0,64 0,63 0,61 0,60 0,59 0,57 0,56 0,55 0,53 0,52 0,51
Vehicle costs (incl. taxes) -13,62 0,00 0,00 -0,70 -0,68 -0,66 -0,63 -0,61 -0,59 -0,57 -0,55 -0,53 -0,52 -0,50 -0,48 -0,46 -0,45 -0,43 -0,42 -0,41 -0,39 -0,38 -0,37 -0,35 -0,34 -0,33 -0,32 -0,31 -0,30 -0,29 -0,28 -0,27 -0,26 -0,25
Transport costs 1,51 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03
Time costs 5,42 0,00 0,00 0,28 0,27 0,26 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,23 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,19 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,10
Vehicle costs (incl. taxes) -3,91 0,00 0,00 -0,20 -0,19 -0,19 -0,18 -0,18 -0,17 -0,16 -0,16 -0,15 -0,15 -0,14 -0,14 -0,13 -0,13 -0,12 -0,12 -0,12 -0,11 -0,11 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09 -0,08 -0,08 -0,08 -0,07 -0,07
Effect on safety -3,96 0,00 0,00 -0,18 -0,17 -0,17 -0,17 -0,16 -0,16 -0,15 -0,15 -0,15 -0,14 -0,14 -0,14 -0,13 -0,13 -0,13 -0,13 -0,12 -0,12 -0,12 -0,11 -0,11 -0,11 -0,11 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09
Accident costs -3,96 0,00 0,00 -0,18 -0,17 -0,17 -0,17 -0,16 -0,16 -0,15 -0,15 -0,15 -0,14 -0,14 -0,14 -0,13 -0,13 -0,13 -0,13 -0,12 -0,12 -0,12 -0,11 -0,11 -0,11 -0,11 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09
Environmental impact 4,83 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,11
Emissions costs 4,83 0,00 0,00 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,11
Noise costs 0 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Impact on public finances 7,16 0,00 0,00 0,37 0,36 0,34 0,33 0,32 0,31 0,30 0,29 0,28 0,27 0,26 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,23 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,13
Fuel tax and VAT 7,16 0,00 0,00 0,37 0,36 0,34 0,33 0,32 0,31 0,30 0,29 0,28 0,27 0,26 0,25 0,24 0,24 0,23 0,22 0,21 0,21 0,20 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,17 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,13
Residual value 7,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,10
Residual value at end of appraisal period 7,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,10
Disadvantages during construction -3,67 -1,87 -1,80 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Benefit-to-Cost ratio 1,64
Table 2. Annual discounted costs and benefits iterated by the author from the Hailuoto project appraisal report. 
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4.2. Interest Rates 
Interest rate data is used to estimate the cost of financing to the public sector in the project 
company model and to the service provider in the public private partnership model. 
The 2019 average annual rate of euro-based 30-year maturity ICE swap rate benchmark is used 
as the reference interest rate (St. Louis Fed, 2020). The longest available maturity for Finnish 
government bonds is currently 10 years, so the ICE swap rate is used as a proxy to represent 
the current market estimate of a 30-year government bond rate. A 30-year interest rate is 
necessary due to the 30-year appraisal period used in this study, but the use of a swap rate as a 
proxy for the purposes of this study should not be understood to refer to the use of interest rate 
swap agreements in the actual project finance arrangements (although they may be used in 
some cases). An interest rate margin as well as a loan arrangement fee based on that margin 
are added on top of the swap rate for the service provider in the PPP model. The public project 
company is assumed to not pay a margin nor an arrangement fee on its debt, due to its’ debt 
being secured on the high sovereign credit rating and the state being a large market participant. 
The interest rate margin for the private sector is based on a consensus estimate provided to the 
author by parties familiar with PPP projects and Finnish financial markets. The interest rate 
margin estimate was current as of Fall 2019. 
The 30-year swap rate used as a reference interest rate in this study is 0,77%. The interest 
margin for the service provider is 1,20%, resulting in a total cost of debt of 1,97% for the 
private sector. 
4.3. Assumptions related to the PPP Service Provider 
Several assumptions regarding the cost structure of the PPP service provider have been made 
in order to calculate the costs of the PPP model in the baseline scenario. These estimates are 
based on several PPP infrastructure projects the author is familiar with as well as on discussions 
with parties experienced in working with PPP projects. The financial statements and cost 
structures of PPP project companies are private, the agreements between public authorities and 
PPP service providers are confidential, and no accurate information on actual realized interest 
rates, equity returns, cost structures or contractual treatment of risks is available. Thus, the 
author’s estimates serve as a baseline around which sensitivity analysis is performed. 
The PPP service provider, being a much smaller market participant than the state, is assumed 
to pay an arrangement fee on its debt contracts. The arrangement fee is defined as a percentage 
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of the interest rate margin and is calculated as the resulting percentage amount (35% * 1,2% = 
0,42%) times the total amount of debt before any capitalized interest or other fees. The 
arrangement fee is paid as a one-off in the beginning of the investment period. 
The PPP service provider is assumed to have an initial capital structure of 10% equity, 90% 
debt. The service provider will pay the debt off during the 30-year appraisal period and the 
capital structure will change accordingly. Baseline value for the equity return requirement is 
set at 10%. 
The concept of the efficiency advantage of the private sector is based on the assumption that a 
private company will design and build an asset more efficiently when it is incentivized to do 
so, e.g. when the cost savings contribute to its profit. The efficiency advantage is applied to 
model calculations by deducting a percentage amount from the total capital expenditure and 
maintenance costs of the project, so that the private sector capital expenditure becomes, in the 
case of a 10% efficiency factor, [(100% – 10%) * 75,9 = 68,31 MEUR] and the annual 
maintenance cost becomes [(100% - 10%) * 0,3 = 0,27 MEUR]. A baseline efficiency 
advantage value of 0% will be used due to inconclusive evidence regarding the existence and 
magnitude of any efficiency advantage. Effect of a potential efficiency advantage will be 
examined in the sensitivity analysis section. 
In a PPP project a special purpose company is set up to act as the service provider, managing 
the project and signing contracts with all associated parties (contracting public authority, 
construction and maintenance companies, financiers and investors). In addition to construction 
and financing costs associated with delivering the project itself, the service provider must cover 
its administrative overhead, insurance costs and contract-related legal fees, among others. For 
the purposes of this study, the author has received a confidential estimate of the typical level 
of these costs in a similar PPP project from parties familiar with Finnish and international PPP 
projects. 
As well as additional costs related to the PPP contract itself, the public authority typically 
incurs substantially higher transaction costs than in the case of traditional budget-financed 
procurement. The transaction costs result from the more involved procurement process of the 
PPP model compared to traditional procurement and include tender compensation costs paid 
to tenderers who submitted bids but were not selected, the public authority’s preparation costs 
and other process costs. The transaction costs are paid by the public authority up-front in the 
beginning of the project. They are not paid to the project company but are incurred by the 
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procuring public authority as a part of the procurement process and must be taken into account 
in comparing the different procurement models. For the purposes of this study, the author has 
received a confidential estimate of the typical level of these costs in a similar PPP project from 
parties familiar with Finnish and international PPP projects. The transaction cost item added to 
the PPP model includes only costs in excess of typical procurement costs of traditional budget 
financed projects and hence transaction costs are not included in the direct budget financing 
and project company models. 
The service provider pays taxes from its profits according to the Finnish corporate tax rate, 
20%. The service provider starts turning profit when revenue from the service payments 
exceeds the maintenance and financing costs as well as depreciation of the causeway asset (30-
year straight-line depreciation is assumed). Tax revenue flows to the public sector and 
effectively reduces the net service payment paid by the public authority, hence taxes are taken 
into account when calculating the benefit-to-cost ratios, economic rates of return and economic 
net present values for the public sector by netting the corporate taxes received against the costs 
incurred by the public authority. 
4.4. Discount Rates 
The societal discount rate used by the public authority to discount costs and benefits is set at 
3,5% according to the FTIA Appraisal Guide for Road Projects (Ristikartano, Iikkanen & 
Mukula, 2013). The service provider discounts its post-tax, post-debt service cash flows with 
the cost of equity, which is set at 10% based on the reported target returns of unlisted 
infrastructure funds from reports by Preqin (2015) and Deloitte (2016). The service payment 
paid by the public authority is set at a level that provides the required equity return to the private 
investors. 
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4.5. Assumption Summary 
Model assumptions used in the financial model calculations are listed in Table 4. below. 
Table 4. Assumption summary. 
Model Assumption Value Comment Source 
All         
  Socio-economic 
benefits 
214,94 
MEUR 
Nominal values 
iterated from 
Hailuoto Causeway 
cost-benefit report 
+ annual 
maintenance cost 
saving 0,3 MEUR. 
Hailuoto Causeway 
Road Plan (Soisalo et al. 
2018) + data treatment 
by author detailed in 
chapter 4.1.1 
  Socio-economic 
costs 
85,4 MEUR Nominal values 
iterated from 
Hailuoto Causeway 
cost-benefit report 
+ annual 
maintenance cost 
0,3 MEUR. 
Hailuoto Causeway 
Road Plan (Soisalo et al. 
2018) + data treatment 
by author detailed in 
chapter 4.1.1 
  Societal 
discount rate 
3,50 % Discount rate 
applied by the 
public sector on its 
socio-economic 
costs and benefits. 
Finnish Transport 
Infrastructure Agency 
2013 Appraisal Guide 
for Road Projects 
(Ristikartano, Iikkanen 
& Mukula, 2013) 
  Investment 
period length 
2 years Period during 
which construction 
costs are incurred. 
Hailuoto Causeway 
Road Plan (Soisalo et al. 
2018) 
 Operating 
period length 
30 years Period for which 
socio-economic 
benefits are 
forecast. 
Hailuoto Causeway 
Road Plan (Soisalo et al. 
2018) 
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Project Company & PPP       
  Reference 
interest rate 
0,77 % Average daily ICE 
euro-denominated 
swap rate in 2019. 
ICE Swap Rates, 12:00 
P.M. (London Time), 
Based on Euros, 30 Year 
Tenor. Economic 
Research data from 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis. 
PPP         
  Corporate tax 
rate 
20 % Finnish corporate 
tax rate in 2020. 
Finnish Tax 
Administration. 
  Public sector 
transaction 
costs 
Confidential Costs paid by the 
public authority in 
year t0 in the PPP 
model. 
Consensus estimate 
provided to the author 
by parties familiar with 
Finnish and international 
PPP projects. 
  Service 
provider 
management 
overhead 
Confidential Paid annually by 
the Service 
Provider, amount 
similar to annual 
maintenance costs. 
Consensus estimate 
provided to the author 
by parties familiar with 
Finnish and international 
PPP projects. 
  Interest margin 1,20 % Added to the 
reference interest 
rate for the Service 
Provider. 
Consensus estimate 
provided for the author 
by parties familiar with 
PPP projects and Finnish 
financial markets 
(current as of Fall 2019). 
  Debt 
arrangement fee 
35% of 
interest 
margin 
One-time payment 
by the Service 
Provider in year t0. 
Consensus estimate 
provided for the author 
by parties familiar with 
PPP projects and Finnish 
financial markets 
(current as of Fall 2019). 
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  Cost of equity 10 % Service payment is 
set to provide the 
Service Provider 
with its target 
return. 
Target returns reported 
by unlisted infrastructure 
funds, based on reports 
by Preqin (2015) and 
Deloitte (2016). 
  Private sector 
efficiency 
advantage 
0 % Exploring the 
efficiency 
advantage left to 
sensitivity analysis 
due to inconclusive 
evidence. 
Studies on historical 
performance of PPP 
projects, for example 
IMF (2004), Herics et al. 
(2018), Leviäkangas 
(2007), Leviäkangas et 
al. (2016). 
 
The assumptions are grouped into general data used for all models, data specific to the Project 
Company and PPP models (the reference interest rate) and data used only for the PPP model. 
The table lists the value used for baseline calculations before sensitivity analysis, clarifying 
comments where necessary and data source. Please see the references chapter for further details 
on sources. 
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5. Methodology 
This chapter details the financial models built to assess the effects of different project financing 
arrangements and explains the key parameters as well as outputs from the models.  
5.1. Financial Models 
I build three financial models to assess the effects of project finance on the socio-economic 
profitability of the Hailuoto Causeway project. The benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR), economic rate 
of return (ERR) and economic net present value (ENPV) are the main outputs from these 
models. Factor-by-factor sensitivity analysis will be performed to address uncertainty 
regarding the baseline parameters. The key focus points in the sensitivity analysis will be: 
1. The societal discount rate (all models), 
2. the length of the investment period (all models), 
3. the reference interest rate (Project Company and PPP Model), 
4. the cost of equity (PPP Model) and 
5. private sector efficiency advantage (PPP Model). 
Further, the effect of project delay due to a budget constraint will be explored in a scenario 
analysis, with the performance of the PPP model with baseline assumptions being compared 
against direct budget financing with project start delayed from one to six years. Scenario 
analysis will be used instead of a factor-by-factor sensitivity analysis, as exploring and 
reporting multiple variations of all the model factors for eight different models (PPP model and 
direct budget financing starting in t0…t6) would not be feasible. 
5.1.1. Direct budget financing 
The direct budget financing model is built using cost and benefit data from the project appraisal 
report included in the Hailuoto Causeway Road Plan after data treatment detailed in chapter 
4.1.1. The benefits and costs are assumed to be incurred as set out in Table 3. This model 
includes no external financing, assumes that investment costs are paid up front and acts as the 
baseline for comparison against the two project finance models. This model is not intended to 
represent the actual practice of how public budget financing is applied, but to serve as a base 
case without financing against which the effects of external financing are examined. In practice 
direct budget-financed projects may include elements of debt financing. 
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5.1.2. Project company 
In the project company model, a project company set up and managed by a public authority 
finances the project with debt secured on the sovereign credit rating. Costs and benefits are 
assumed to result from the project like in the direct budget financing model, but instead of 
paying the costs up front the project company uses 100% debt financing and repays the debt 
with interest over the appraisal period. The debt is drawn in years t0…t1, the interest rate is 
fixed at 0,77% and interest is capitalized into total debt during the construction period; thus, 
the public authority is assumed to only incur a negative cash flow of -0,50 MEUR in year t0 for 
Design and planning, as these costs would be incurred for a large part before the start of the 
project. Deferring the costs in this manner brings them in line with the benefits resulting from 
the project, allowing equal application of the discount factor to both costs and benefits. 
5.1.3. PPP model 
In the PPP model scenario, a public authority contracts the project out as a comprehensive 
service agreement. A private service provider builds and maintains the causeway over the 30-
year appraisal period and is compensated by service payments made by the public authority 
when the asset is available for use. Benefits are assumed to remain the same as in the two 
previous scenarios, while costs are affected by the efficiency advantage of the private sector, 
the increased cost of capital as well as potentially expedited project start. The project can 
potentially be started earlier than in the other models due to the reduced budgetary requirement 
described in chapter 2.2.1.1. Finally, it is assumed that the public authority incurs additional 
transaction costs owing to the complex nature of the procurement process associated with PPP 
arrangements. 
In the baseline scenario, the service provider’s interest margin is 1,20%, resulting in a total 
interest rate of 1,97% together with the reference interest rate of 0,77%. The service provider 
will also pay an arrangement fee equal to 0,35% of the interest margin times the amount of 
debt (Construction costs before capitalized interest). Capital structure of the project company 
is assumed to be 10% equity and 90% debt. The return requirement (cost of equity) of the 
equity investors is 10%. The baseline efficiency advantage of the private sector is assumed to 
be 0%; due to inconclusive evidence regarding the existence of an efficiency advantage, 
applying the efficiency factor is left to the sensitivity analysis. 
The PPP service provider makes a profit from service payments paid by the contracting public 
authority. The annual service payment is fixed for the 30 years of operation and its size is 
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optimized to provide the service provider with its equity return requirement, 10% in the 
baseline scenario. When the service provider’s service payment revenue exceeds its total costs, 
the company produces a profit and pays corporate taxes. The corporate taxes received reduce 
the effective net service payment paid by the public authority. This results in three separate 
calculations within the PPP project model; first, cash flow calculation of the service provider, 
second, accounting income calculation of the service provider for determining corporate tax to 
be paid, which goes back into the cash flow calculation, and third, cash flow calculation of the 
public authority for determining the benefit-to-cost ratio, the economic rate of return and the 
economic net present value of the project.
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6. Results 
The results of this study, outputs from the three financial models, are detailed in this chapter. 
Subchapters 6.1. and 6.2. provide a detailed look into the results regarding research questions 
(1) and (2). Subchapter 6.3. contains factor-by-factor sensitivity analysis regarding research 
question (1) and subchapter 6.4. contains scenario analysis regarding research question (2). 
Subchapter 6.5. includes a summary table of findings along with a brief discussion. 
6.1. Effect of Project Finance on the Socio-economic Profitability of the Hailuoto 
Causeway Project 
The accumulation of costs for the three financing models can be seen in Figure 2.  
In the direct budget financing model, investment costs are incurred during the two-year 
investment period, after which only 0,3 MEUR annual maintenance costs are paid. The cost 
profiles of the project company and PPP model options are similar, with the PPP model having 
significantly higher costs due to the increased cost of financing and management overhead. 
Unlike in the PPP model, the present value of costs in the project company model is lower than 
in the direct budget financing option despite the higher nominal costs.  
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Figure 2. Cumulative Present Values of Hailuoto Causeway benefits and costs. 
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Figure 3. displays the cumulative benefit-to-cost ratios (BCR) of the project with the different 
financing models. The project company and PPP model start with deeply negative initial ratios 
because there is a negative benefit during construction but, unlike in direct budget financing, 
no significant costs in the denominator. The negative benefit consists of nuisances caused by 
the construction site to the surrounding area, such as noise and vibration. As expected based 
on financial theory, the project company model maintains the highest benefit-to-cost ratio 
throughout the project, ending up with a ratio of 2,12. The benefit-to-cost ratio of the PPP 
model exceeds direct budget financing from opening-to-traffic until year 18, ultimately ending 
up with a ratio of 1,16. The benefit-to-cost ratio of the direct budget financing option is 1,50, 
below the 1,64 provided in the Hailuoto project appraisal report due to factors discussed in the 
data treatment section in chapter 4.1.1. The project would be socio-economically profitable 
with all financing options, as no model has a BCR of under one.  
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Figure 3. Cumulative Benefit-to-Cost Ratios of Direct Budget Financing, Project Company and PPP models. 
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Figure 4. Economic Net Present Value (ENPV) of the different financing models. 
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Figure 4. displays the economic net present value (ENPV) of the project with the three 
financing options. The project company model has the highest ENPV at 63,9, MEUR, with 
direct budget financing following at 40,5 MEUR and PPP model being the least economically 
advantageous option with an ENPV of 16,8 MEUR. 
Figure 5. displays the economic rates of return (ERR) of the project for the three financing 
models. Unlike with the benefit-to-cost ratio and the economic net present value, the economic 
rate of return of the PPP model exceeds direct budget financing. This results from the earlier 
positive cumulative cash flows of the PPP model, which are assumed to be reinvested at the 
ERR rate in the calculation. The ERR of the project company model is again highest at 62,5%, 
with PPP and direct budget financing models following at 12,9% and 6,8%, respectively.  
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Figure 5. Economic Rate of Return (ERR) of the different financing models. 
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6.2. Expediting Project Start with Off-budget Financing 
The socio-economic benefits of a project can potentially be realized earlier by using private 
financing to augment public investment budgets. I test the effect of delay on the socio-
economic profitability of the project by constructing timelines for delayed investment and 
operating periods, starting in years t0…t6. A negative opportunity cost, equal to the net benefit 
(socio-economic benefits less operating costs of the new project) forgone by delaying the 
project, is added to the delayed project timelines for the years during which those benefits 
would have been received if the project was started on time. The nominal value of this 
opportunity cost of delay is [6,62 – 0,3] = 6,32 MEUR. The opportunity cost is discounted to 
year t0 of the delayed project, thus the marginal opportunity cost of a one-year delay decreases 
when the total delay increases. The appraisal period remains 30 years for the delayed timelines. 
Figures 6. And 7. illustrate the cumulative benefit-to-cost ratios and economic net present 
values of the PPP model started in year t0 compared to direct budget-financed projects starting 
from t0…t6. With this paper’s baseline assumptions, the budget constraint would need to delay 
the start of the project for four years for the PPP model to be more socio-economically 
profitable than waiting for sufficient budget for direct budget financing. 
These results show that the budget constraint-related delay required to make the PPP model 
socio-economically preferable to waiting for sufficient budget corresponds to the four-year 
span of the General Government Fiscal Plan. Since the project does not fit into the fiscal plan, 
the agency must make a choice between using more expensive but still profitable private 
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Figure 6. Benefit-to-Cost ratios of PPP Model and Direct Budget Financing with increasing delays. 
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financing or waiting until the next budgeting period. It is difficult to predict what new project 
opportunities emerge and how political decision-makers view those projects. If there are more 
socio-economically profitable project opportunities than fit into public investment budgets, this 
may lead to good projects being abandoned. Due to these reasons it may be justifiable to use 
the PPP model even though the costs exceed those of budget financing. 
In the following section different assumptions are explored to find further insight into the 
relative advantages of these financing models. 
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6.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
So far it has been shown that the socio-economic profitability of public infrastructure 
investments, measured in present values, can be improved by using external financing, 
particularly the project company model. Next, sensitivity analysis will be performed to assess 
the effects of changes in key assumptions made in these analyses. 
The three models are compared to see how their benefit-to-cost ratios, economic rates of return 
and economic net present values react to changes in key model parameters and if and how these 
changes alter the models’ comparative advantages. All analyses are conducted ceteris paribus 
to isolate the effects of individual factors. 
With the direct budget financing model, only the discount rate and investment period length 
can be analyzed since that model does not include financing assumptions. The project company 
model introduces the reference interest rate as an additional factor, while the PPP model 
features two further factors concerning the private sector: the cost of equity and the efficiency 
advantage of the private sector. 
6.3.1. Societal discount rate 
The benefit-to-cost ratio (BCR) and the economic net present value (ENPV) of the three models 
are measured as the societal discount rate is altered between 2,00% and 4,00% with 0,25% 
intervals. 
Figure 8. shows the effect of 0,25% interval changes in the discount rate on the benefit-to-cost 
ratio of the three models. We see that the BCR of the direct budget financing model is 
significantly affected by increases in the discount rate, while the effect on the project company 
and PPP models is significantly smaller. In the latter two models benefits and costs occur at 
the same time, negating the effect of the discount rate on their ratio. Thus, it can be stated that, 
ceteris paribus, increasing discount rates improve the relative profitability of models using 
external financing. This is reflected in the economic rates of return of the three models, with 
the breakeven rates being 6,8%, 62,5% and 12,9% for direct budget financing, project company 
and PPP model, respectively. This means that, should the societal discount rate exceed 6,8% 
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the benefit-to-cost ratio of the direct budget financed project would fall under one and the 
project would be considered socio-economically unprofitable without external financing.  
Figure 9. shows the effect of the same changes in the discount rate on the economic net present 
value of the project. As with the BCR, the ENPV of direct budget financing approaches the 
PPP model as the discount rate increases. 
It is of course not realistic to assume that the discount rate could be set independently of the 
cost of debt, as the cost of sovereign debt forms a part of the societal discount rate. If the cost 
of financing increased along with the discount rate, it would reduce the advantage of the project 
company and PPP model options over the direct budget financing option. However, the 
individual effect of the discount rate is presented here in keeping with ceteris paribus to isolate 
the effect of a single factor.  
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Figure 8. Benefit-to-Cost ratio with increasing discount rate. 
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Figure 9. Economic Net Present Value with increasing societal discount rate. 
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6.3.2. Length of the investment period 
The length of the investment period, during which only costs and negative benefits (e.g. 
construction period nuisances) are incurred, should have a significant effect on the comparative 
performance of each financing model. The BCR, ERR and ENPV are measured as the 
investment period length is changed between 1 (-1 to the baseline) and 10 (+8 to the baseline) 
with one-year intervals.  
Figure 10. displays the BCR for increasing investment period lengths. We see that the benefit-
to-cost ratio of the project decreases with increasing investment period length. The present 
value of the socio-economic benefits received from the project decreases as those benefits are 
deferred further into the future. This effect is most pronounced for the PPP model and 
significant also for direct budget financing, while impact on the project company model is very 
small. The project would no longer be socio-economically profitable as a PPP with an 
investment period of six years.  
The change in the ERR when length of the investment period increases is displayed in Figure 
11. The ERR decreases exponentially as the investment period lengthens, the change being 
more pronounced for increases in the short end. ERR of the PPP model crosses direct budget 
financing between years 4 and 5 and goes to zero in year 6, while the ERR curve of project 
company flattens out at slightly above 20% in year 10 (and does not change considerably for 
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Figure 10. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio with increasing investment period length. 
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longer periods, not displayed here), remaining above direct budget financing even for a 10-year 
investment period.  
Figure 12. displays the ENPV with different investment period lengths. As with the BCR, the 
project company shows best performance with all tested investment period lengths, with the 
difference to direct budget financing increasing with longer investment periods. The PPP model 
performs the worst, with negative ENPVs for investment periods of six years or more.  
The rapid decrease in the PPP model’s performance metrics with a lengthening investment 
period is explained by the private equity return requirement. As the service provider’s equity 
investors demand a 10% annual return on equity and the service provider will be paid only after 
the investment period, the service payment paid by the public authority in the operating period 
must be increasingly large to produce the return demanded by the investors – while the public 
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Figure 11. Economic Rate of Return with increasing investment period length.  
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sector discounts future cash flows with a 3,50% discount rate, the investors discount their 
payoffs (service provider’s post-debt service, post-tax residual cash flows) with the cost of 
equity – 10%. 
Based on these results, it can be stated that financing a project with debt placed in a project 
company increases profitability compared to financing the costs directly from the public 
budget. The effect is more pronounced for projects with long investment periods, while private 
equity financing is best suited for projects with early investor payoffs. 
6.3.3. Reference interest rate 
The BCR, ERR and ENPV of the three financing models are measured when the reference 
interest rate increases from 0,50% to 4,0% with 0,25-percentage point intervals. The PPP model 
includes the baseline assumptions of 90% debt financing and 1,20% interest rate margin (added 
to the reference rate).  
Figure 13. displays the effect of increasing reference interest rate on the BCR. The line 
representing the project company model crosses direct budget financing when the reference 
interest rate matches the applied societal discount rate, 3,50%. This happens because the 
advantage received from deferring negative cash flows results from the cost of financing being 
less than the value placed by the payer on having more funds available for current consumption. 
The benefit thus disappears when the cost of financing matches the discount rate. The BCR of 
the PPP model is less affected by the reference interest rate for several reasons: first, the interest 
rate margin on the private sector debt remains constant, meaning a 0,25 percentage point 
change in the reference rate is a much smaller proportional change than if the total cost of debt 
consisted entirely of the reference rate. Second, the PPP service provider is 90% debt-financed 
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Figure 13. Benefit-to-Cost ratio with increasing reference interest rate. 
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instead of 100% as is the case with the public project company. Third, as the PPP service 
provider pays taxes on its profit, the increasing interest payments are partly compensated for 
by the increasing value of the tax shield of debt. 
Based on these findings, it can be stated that applying external financing increases the present-
value benefit-to-cost ratio of a project as long as the cost of external financing is lower than 
the discount rate used. It should be noted that the breakeven point for the interest rate is not 
exactly the same as the discount rate because of the higher nominal total costs of the externally-
financed project resulting from sources other than pure interest, such as the costs of setting up 
and managing a separate project company and any debt arrangement fees that could result 
(although not assumed here for the project company model). 
Figure 14. displays the ERR of the financing models with increasing reference interest rates.  
Unlike the BCR and ENPV, the ERR of the PPP model is almost double the ERR of direct 
budget financing with the baseline assumptions. This is due to the front-loaded positive net 
benefit flow profile of the PPP model compared to direct budget financing. The ERR of the 
PPP model is less affected by the increasing interest rate than the ERR of the project company 
for the reasons mentioned earlier. The ERR of the PPP project falls below direct budget 
financing around a reference interest rate of 2,00%, at which point the service provider’s 
project life average weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 4,33%. 
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Figure 14. Economic Rate of Return with increasing reference interest rate. 
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Figure 15. displays the ENPV for the financing models with increasing reference interest rates. 
Everything written about the BCR applies to the ENPV; breakeven point for project company 
and direct budget financing occurs just below 3,50% reference interest rate, while the PPP 
project is no longer socio-economically profitable with reference interest rates at 3,00% or 
above (WACC 4,88%). 
6.3.4. Cost of equity 
The performance of the PPP model relative to the direct budget financing and project company 
models is examined as the cost of equity – the return requirement of the PPP service provider’s 
equity investors – changes.  
Figure 16. displays the BCR when the cost of equity increases. With the other baseline 
assumptions static, the PPP model cannot break even with direct budget financing even with 
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Figure 15. Economic Net Present Value with increasing reference interest rate. 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
0,0 % 5,0 % 5,5 % 6,0 % 6,5 % 7,0 % 7,5 % 8,0 % 8,5 % 9,0 % 9,5 % 10,0 %10,5 %11,0 %11,5 %12,0 %
BCR with increasing cost of equity
Direct Budget Financing Project Company PPP Model
Figure 16. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio with increasing cost of equity. 
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zero-return equity investment. The benefit-to-cost ratio of the PPP model does not suffer 
significantly from increasing equity return requirements, as the decrease in the benefit-to-cost 
ratio between 5,0% and 12,0% cost of equity (140% increase) is only 0,26 or 19%, while an 
increase from the baseline 10% to 11% (10% increase) would only decrease the BCR by 0,03 
or 3%. 
Figure 17. displays the ERR when the cost of equity increases. ERR of the PPP model remains 
between direct budget financing and project company models over the full tested range.  
Figure 18. displays the ENPV when the sector cost of equity increases. As with the benefit-to-
cost ratio, the PPP model cannot break even with any cost of equity.  
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Figure 17. Economic Rate of Return with increasing cost of equity. 
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Figure 18. Economic Net Present Value with increasing cost of equity. 
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6.3.5. Private sector efficiency advantage 
The concept of the private sector efficiency advantage is built on the assumption that the private 
sector, if given sufficient degrees of freedom in project design and execution, can design and 
deliver a project with lower costs than would be the case in a traditional budget-financed 
procurement, especially if the private sector is allowed a part of the cost savings as an additional 
return and is thus incentivized to find efficiencies. There is, however, little evidence on how 
construction and maintenance costs of PPP projects compare with other procurement methods. 
This is because the companies acting as PPP service providers are private and not required to 
publicize their cost structures.  
Figure 19. displays the BCRs for the three financing models when the efficiency advantage of 
the private sector increases from 0% to 20% with one percentage point intervals as well as the 
breakeven points where the PPP project option is equal with direct budget financing and 
external financing, 25,7% and 50,9% respectively.  
Figure 20. displays the ERR for the three financing models with the same efficiency advantage 
intervals. Finally, figure 21. displays the ENPV for the three financing models with the same 
efficiency advantage intervals. The same breakeven points as with the benefit-to-cost ratio 
apply. These results show that potential efficiency advantages alone are inadequate to make 
the PPP project option competitive. However, depending on the project 10% to 20% cost 
savings could well be feasible, covering a significant portion of the additional financing costs 
associated with the model.  
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 26% 51%
BCR with increasing private sector efficiency advantage
Direct Budget Financing Project Company PPP Model
Figure 19. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio with increasing private sector efficiency advantage. 
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A combination of the examined factors could potentially significantly improve the performance 
of the PPP option; the baseline assumptions about the interest rate margin and the efficiency 
advantage factor used in this study are rather conservative – the interest rate margin could well 
be lower than 1,2%, while the efficiency advantage would likely be positive instead of 0%. 
Further, a project with a larger capital expenditure would have better opportunities for cost 
savings via the efficiency advantage factor – the Hailuoto project is rather small and is viewed 
by some as being too small to be contracted as a PPP, with a capital expenditure of only 75,9 
MEUR. In a project involving a new type of infrastructure, or infrastructure with which public 
authorities are otherwise unfamiliar with, the innovation capability and expertise of the private 
sector harnessed via a PPP model could bring significant advantages compared to a public 
sector-driven project model. 
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Figure 20.  ERR with increasing private sector efficiency advantage. 
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Figure 21. ENPV with increasing private sector efficiency advantage. 
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6.4. Scenario Analysis 
In this section the direct budget financing model will be compared with the PPP model in three 
different scenarios. Assumptions regarding the direct budget financing model will be kept 
constant, while assumptions regarding the PPP model are altered to examine the effect on the 
required direct budget financing project delay that would make the PPP model option socio-
economically preferable. 
In the base scenario, budget constraints would have had to delay the project for four years for 
the PPP model to be the preferred option. The three scenarios examined are: 
1. Cost of Equity decreases from 10% to 8% 
2. Private Sector Efficiency Advantage increases from 0% to 10% 
3. Combined effects of 1. and 2. 
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6.4.1. Scenario 1 
Figures 22. and 23. show the BCRs and ENPVs for the PPP model and direct budget financing 
models with project starts in years y0…y6. A decrease in the cost of equity to 8% (ceteris 
paribus) reduces the delay required from four to three years.  
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Figure 22. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio with 8% Cost of Equity. 
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Figure 23. Economic Net Present Value with 8% Cost of Equity. 
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6.4.2. Scenario 2 
Figures 24. and 25. show the BCRs and ENPVs with a 10% private sector efficiency advantage 
being applied to the costs in the PPP model. The 10% efficiency factor has the same effect as 
a two-percentage-point decrease in the cost of equity, reducing the delay needed from four 
years to three. The absolute effect is slightly larger, however. 
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Figure 24. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio with 10% Private Sector Efficiency Advantage.  
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Figure 25. Economic Net Present Value with 10% Private Sector Efficiency Advantage. 
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6.4.3. Scenario 3 
Figures 26. and 27. show the combined effects of scenarios 1 and 2: 8% cost of equity combined 
with a 10% reduction in capital expenditures and maintenance costs in the PPP model. The 
required delay decreases further to two years. 
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Figure 26. Benefit-to-Cost Ratio with 8% Cost of Equity and 10% Private Sector Efficiency Advantage. 
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Figure 27. Economic Net Present Value with 8% Cost of Equity and 10% Private Sector Efficiency Advantage. 
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6.5. Summary of Findings 
The results are summarized in Table 5. below based on findings examined in this chapter.  
Table 5. Summary of Findings. 
Research Question Finding Comment 
Using project finance to defer 
negative cash flows into the future 
should improve the benefit-to-cost 
ratio, economic rate of return and 
economic net present value of the 
Hailuoto Causeway project 
Significant 
improvement in BCR 
and ENPV with Project 
Company model, only 
ERR improved with 
PPP model. 
Timing costs to coincide 
with benefits improves 
net present value, but the 
improvement is not 
enough to cover 
additional costs of the 
PPP model. 
The relative advantage of project 
finance should increase with the 
societal discount rate 
Significant 
improvement for Project 
Company and PPP. 
 
The relative advantage of project 
finance should increase with length 
of the investment period 
Moderate improvement 
for Project Company, 
significant decrease for 
PPP. 
PPP model seems to not 
suit long investment 
periods due to investors' 
equity return demands.  
The relative advantage of project 
finance should decrease as the 
reference interest rate increases 
Yes, effect larger for 
Project Company, 
advantage disappears as 
cost of financing 
approaches discount 
rate. 
Effect smaller for PPP 
due to lower leverage 
and presence of other 
financing costs in 
addition to reference 
interest rate. 
Performance of the PPP model 
should decrease as the cost of equity 
increases 
Yes, moderate effect. Cost of equity forms a 
relatively small share of 
the PPP financing costs. 
Performance of the PPP model 
should improve as the private sector 
efficiency advantage increases 
Yes, significant effect. Construction and 
maintenance cost 
improvements 
significant but not 
enough to cover the 
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higher financing costs in 
a project of this size. 
Using a procurement model 
employing private equity 
financing to expedite project start 
should improve the benefit-to-cost 
ratio, economic rate of return and 
economic net present value of the 
Hailuoto Causeway project 
compared to delaying investment 
until sufficient budget is available 
PPP model is preferable 
over direct budget 
financing with a delay 
of four years. 
A four-year delay pushes 
a project onto the next 
budgeting period, 
introducing high 
uncertainty about future 
budget allocation. 
Tested with two-percentage point 
decrease in the cost of equity 
PPP model is preferable 
over direct budget 
financing with a delay 
of three years. 
Delaying the project 
does not guarantee 
receiving budget 
financing, as there is 
rarely sufficient budget 
available to finance all 
good projects. 
Tested with 10% increase in private 
sector efficiency advantage 
PPP model is preferable 
over direct budget 
financing with a delay 
of three years. 
Delaying the project 
does not guarantee 
receiving budget 
financing, as there is 
rarely sufficient budget 
available to finance all 
good projects. 
Tested with combination of lower 
cost of equity and higher efficiency 
PPP model is preferable 
over direct budget 
financing with a delay 
of two years. 
Delaying the project 
does not guarantee 
receiving budget 
financing, as there is 
rarely sufficient budget 
available to finance all 
good projects. 
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Distributing investment costs over the project appraisal period using low-cost public debt in 
the project company model improved the appraisal metrics. However, additional costs in the 
PPP model led to lower performance with regards to the benefit-to-cost ratio and economic net 
present value than the direct budget financing option. The PPP model improved the economic 
rate of return compared to direct budget financing, however, due to delayed commitment of 
capital, allowing investment of public funds into other profitable projects as well. This finding 
supports the use of the PPP model in presence of abundant profitable investment opportunities, 
especially if there are constraints to raising public debt for the project company model. 
In the sensitivity analysis, the societal discount rate was found to be highly influential, with 
increasing discount rates significantly affecting project profitability in the direct budget 
financing model but having very little effect in the project company and PPP models – thus the 
relative advantage of the two latter models increases with the discount rate. Reference interest 
rate was found to be significant in the debt-funded project company and PPP models and 
showed that the profitability-enhancing effects of external financing exist only when the cost 
of financing is lower than the societal discount rate. The PPP model failed to produce these 
benefits as its financing cost exceeds the baseline discount rate (3,5%) – construction and 
maintenance cost efficiency would need to be 25,7% lower to make up for the higher financing 
costs. Length of the investment period proved to be a moderately significant factor. The longer 
the time between incurring costs and receiving benefits, the greater the potential benefit from 
using low-cost external financing to spread the costs out over the life of the project. For projects 
with long investment periods, only the public project company model is feasible, as the 
performance of the PPP model decreases rapidly with longer investment periods due to the 
high private equity return requirement. This can be alleviated by making so-called milestone 
payments to the PPP service provider already during the investment period, tied to reaching 
pre-determined stages of completion. In this example case the cost of equity had relatively little 
effect on the results. This is an interesting finding, especially when considering how much 
attention is paid to private equity payoffs from public projects; PPP service providers have 
typically very debt-weighted capital structures, in this case 90% debt to 10% equity. For this 
reason, any reasonable increase in the cost of equity has little effect on the overall cost of the 
project to the public. The private sector efficiency advantage has a large effect on the 
profitability of the PPP model. In this example case the efficiency advantage would have 
needed to be 25,7% for the PPP model to break even with direct budget financing. It would be 
hard to argue that the private sector could be this much more efficient in construction and 
74 
maintenance, but if we consider the value of risk transfer to be reflected in the efficiency factor 
that level could be feasible. Further, as has been mentioned the Hailuoto Causeway is small for 
a PPP project and there are limited options for innovation and cost savings; the comparative 
standing of the PPP model could be different in a larger project owing to the private sector 
efficiency advantage alone. 
Expediting project start by financing the project with private capital was found to be profitable 
if the budget constraint was expected to delay the project by four years or more. Testing with 
the equity return requirement lowered to 8% decreased the required delay to three years. 
Testing with a 10% private sector efficiency advantage factor similarly decreased the required 
delay to three years, but the effect on costs was greater than that of a two-percentage point 
decrease in the cost of equity.  Combining the lower cost of equity with the higher private 
sector efficiency factor further decreased the required delay to two years.
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7. Conclusions 
This study has examined how evaluating different project finance arrangements can affect 
results of public infrastructure project appraisal. The cost-benefit analysis data from the 
Hailuoto Causeway project appraisal report was fed into three different financial models to 
assess the effects of external financing. The Hailuoto Causeway project was modelled as a 
direct budget financed project, as a project managed by a public sector-owned, 100% debt-
financed project company and as a private capital-financed public private partnership project. 
The project company model showed the best results for the benefit-to-cost ratio, the economic 
rate of return and the economic net present value. The project company has access to very low-
cost debt secured on the sovereign credit rating, deferring investment costs while incurring 
very low financing costs. The direct budget financing model, representing a base case with 
investment costs paid up front and no financing involved, was second in both benefit-to-cost 
ratio and economic net present value, while the public private partnership model was second 
in the economic rate of return but performed the worst in terms of the benefit-to-cost ratio and 
the economic net present value. The PPP model carries high additional costs not present in the 
two public sector models, namely administrative and insurance costs of the service provider, 
higher costs of debt financing as well as the private equity return requirement. The PPP model 
returned a better economic rate of return than direct budget financing, explained by delayed 
commitment of capital enabling investment of public funds in other profitable projects. 
A significant advantage of the PPP model is the ability to augment public investment budgets. 
When faced with a budget constraint, the public authority has three options: delay the project 
until a new budgeting period, procure the project as a PPP or abandon the project. If the project 
is socio-economically profitable (benefit-to-cost ratio over one) the options to be explored are 
of course the first two. Delaying results in forfeiting socio-economic benefits for the duration 
of the delay, while procuring as a PPP increases the financing costs of the project. Delaying 
may eventually lead to abandoning the project or delaying for a longer time than is optimal, as 
future project opportunities, budget sizes and political priorities are difficult to predict. On the 
other hand, to be procured as a PPP the project must be socio-economically profitable enough 
to carry the additional costs of the PPP model; in this example case the baseline benefit-to-cost 
ratio of direct budget financing is 1,50 against 1,16 of the PPP model. If the project is not 
profitable enough to be procured as a PPP and does not fit into the investment budget, it may 
eventually be abandoned even if its benefit-to-cost ratio is over one. 
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A significant factor regarding the PPP model not comprehensively covered by this study is risk 
transfer. In a PPP model, the service provider assumes responsibility for project design, 
construction, and service provision (and sometimes others as well, such as demand). 
Transferring risks to the service provider carries positive value for the public authority that 
should be taken into account; if the service provider fails to provide the comprehensive service 
according to contract, and the failure is due to factors under the responsibility of the service 
provider, the public authority can withhold payment. This study assumes that the public 
authority makes the full amount of service payments to the service provider throughout the 
project appraisal period, e.g. deductions are not modeled. No data is available on realized 
payment deductions in availability-based PPP contracts, so in this study the private sector 
efficiency advantage variable is assumed to capture both the direct project-related efficiencies 
(e.g. construction and maintenance cost savings) as well as the value of risk transfer and 
potential service payment deductions. 
Based on these findings, evaluating potential project financing options could be worthwhile 
already in the project appraisal phase, even if their effects are not integrated into the cost-
benefit analysis itself. Public sector debt, secured on the sovereign credit rating, is the most 
efficient way of spreading project costs out over the life of the project but places a strain on 
public balance sheets. Private equity-financed models, such as PPPs, place the debt on the 
balance sheets of private sector companies, easing the strain on already burdened public 
balance sheets. Further, in the Finnish setting they allow government agencies to start 
investment projects outside investment budgets, although signing long-term investment 
contracts with private financiers requires a special budget authorization from the Parliament 
and so PPPs do not grant government agencies access to “open checkbooks”. PPPs incur 
additional financing and procurement costs on the public sector and for that reason are only 
suitable for projects that are socio-economically profitable enough to carry them. This leads to 
the idea that private capital should be used to finance highly profitable investments that do not 
have a high enough priority to secure direct financing from investment budgets – using private 
capital can enable socio-economically profitable projects that would otherwise be abandoned 
due to insufficient public budget or other constraints, benefiting both the public and the private 
sector as the name public private partnership implies.
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